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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977 and 1978 the Supreme Court of the United States
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brought the contract clause1 out of retirement 2 to strike down two
state statutes.3 A majority of the Court 4 apparently believed that
the contract clause, once a mighty warrior against state interfer-
ence with property rights,5 had potential as a source of intermedi-
ate judicial review. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,' the
Court refitted the clause with a right fist of iron for use against a
state's impairment of its own obligations; and in Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Span naus,J the Court made the clause an extremely
versatile soldier, giving it a left fist of aluminum for use against
interference with private contracts. It appeared that the clause
would stand alongside the taking clause s as a rear guard protecting
against certain types of retroactive economic legislation-a limited,
and arguably arbitrary, response to lingering doubts about the wis-.
dom of the disavowal of judicial review under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment."
The Court's enchantment appears, however, to have been
short-lived. 10 In two unanimous" decisions during 1983, the Court
1. "No state shall .... pass any ...law impairing the obligation of contracts." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
2. For views as to the importance of the clause before 1977, see E. CORWIN, THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 102-05 (H. Chase & C. Ducat rev. ed. 1973); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465-73 (1978); Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The
Renaissance of the Contract Clause, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 95 (1979).
3. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
4. Spannaus was a five-to-three plurality decision; however, Justice Blackmun, a
nonparticipator in Spannaus, wrote the majority opinion in United States Trust.
5. For detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's consideration of the contract clause
during the 19th and early 20th centuries, see 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY ch. 14 (1965); B. WRIGHT, THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONTITUTION (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract
Clause, 57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 621, 852 (1944).
6. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
7. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
8. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The taking clause is incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980);
Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
9. The number of contract clause cases in which parties sought Supreme Court review
indicates the increased importance of the contract clause after United States Trust and
Spannaus. From the appointment of Justices Powell and Rehnquist, which solidified the
"Burger Court" in January of 1972, until April 27, 1977, when the Court decided United
States Trust, there were 22 denials of certiorari and dismissals of appeal that included con-
tract clause issues. From the decision in United States Trust until last term's decision in
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), there were
43 denials of certiorari and dismissals of appeal that presented contract clause questions.
10. The doctrinal leaps taken in United States Trust and Spannaus, the atypical na-
ture of the statutes involved, and Justice Brennan's strident dissents all foreshadowed a
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all but nullified the contract clause. Energy Reserves Group, Inc.
v. Kansas Power & Light Co.12 and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton s in-
dicate the Court's retreat from the broader implications of United
States Trust and Spannaus and, perhaps, its return to "classical"
contract clause analysis. Neither case involved public contracts,
but the Court's approach suggests that the clause may be at issue
only in municipal finance wars.14
This Article is an inquiry into whether the clause is worth sav-
ing. The inquiry is two-pronged. One prong is whether the clause
can be given a sound doctrinal basis that will provide a high degree
of reliability in constitutional decision-making. The other prong is
whether a viable contract clause is consistent with post-Depression
views regarding judicial interference with economic legislation. 5
This Article argues that the clause can be put on a strong, al-
though undeniably complex, doctrinal foundation and that a viable
contract clause is not only consistent with current standards of re-
view under the due process and equal protection clauses, but could
reduce the tension that the nonreview policy generates among
members of the Court.'
limiting decision. Professor Powe concluded that Justice Stewart's opinion in Spannaus was
so poorly reasoned that it would probably not have any constitutional significance. Powe,
Populist Fiscal Restraints and the Contract Clause, 65 IOWA L. Rzv. 963, 971 (1980).
11. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
12. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). Though the Court decided a contract clause issue earlier in the
term in Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), the contract clause claim was disposed of in a
paragraph. See 454 U.S. at 531. The Court was correct in finding that the alleged impair-
ment-the filing of a notice of claim-was almost trivial in comparison with the drastic
consequences of noncompliance.
13. 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983).
14. Most of the scholarly comment on United States Trust relates to its effect on mu-
nicipal bond issues. See, e.g., Hurst, Municipal Bonds and the Contract Clause: Looking
Beyond United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 25 (1978); Kraft &
St. John, The Contract Clause as Guardian Against Legislative Impairment of Municipal
Bondholders' Rights, 6 SaroN HALL L. Rav. 48 (1977).
15. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Ex-
humation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 34 (1962) (characterizing the demise of judicial
review of economic legislation as abdication by the Court and arguing for the revival of a
limited economic due process doctrine). The primary focus here will be on the first part of
the inquiry because the policy and internal consistency of contract clause doctrine have yet
to be adequately explained. The second part of the inquiry is dealt with less comprehen-
sively because the general question of the proper scope of judicial review has been so widely
debated and because the clause does have a policy basis that distinguishes it from the due
process and equal protection clauses. Moreover, the persuasiveness of the conclusions
reached with respect to the first prong of our inquiry goes a long way toward justifying a
conclusion as to the second prong.
16. The Court's debate over the meaning of the "equal protection rational basis" test
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Because most lawyers are. not familiar with the contract
clause, this Article briefly reviews its history and provides a more
detailed discussion of the Burger Court's decisions, before raising
the threshold question of what is meant by the "obligation" of a
contract. The nature of the contract rights in general and the his-
torical purposes of the clause, demonstrate that the clause should
protect only contractual interests that have been "purchased" by
investment-backed reliance and that could not have been insulated
by a bargained-for contractual clause that shifts the risk of govern-
ment action. This conclusion is based in large part on the view that
the policy underlying the clause is still valid: Contract rights de-
serve special protection because they are perhaps the one property
interest that is most closely related to allocative efficiency and the
growth of commerce. They represent resources in transition. In
this regard, the contract clause is less similar to the due process
clause than it is to the taking and commerce clauses. Like the tak-
ing clause, it includes an element of equity-retroactive laws are
unfair-and, like the commerce clause, an element of effi-
ciency-interference with commerce by individual states reduces
the size of the national economic pie.17
After determining the meaning of a contract obligation, the
second step in the analysis is the reconciliation of the contract
clause with the taking clause. In most cases, legislation that seem-
ingly impairs a contract obligation will also "take" it, entitling the
claimant to just compensation. Because a compensation award is
an adequate remedy, the contract clause should not be interpreted
to invalidate statutes that merely take. Only if a taking clause
claim is not-available does a statute even arguably "impair" an
obligation.
This Article demonstrates that the converse of this last state-
demonstrates this tension. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422 (1982);
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
17. The terminology used in the last textual sentence is about as close as this Article
will get to notions of welfare economics. Although Professors Ackerman, infra note 171;
Michelman, infra note 221; and Sax, infra note 206, employ utilitarian concepts in analyzing
"taking" issues, the practical problems of measuring either costs or benefits mean that the
concepts are of little use to judges or lawyers. Moreover, efficiency considerations, although
central to an understanding of economic theory, are of little or no use in specific factual
situations. Conclusions about more or less efficient outcomes depend on the existence of the
assumptions underlying the economic model being used. Because those assumptions are
merely theoretical in nature, any conclusion about efficiency can be made only after an ex-
temely detailed study of the true facts and circumstances that surround a particular case.
See SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 2 (2d ed.
1980).
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ment is not true-a contract clause claim does not exist simply be-
cause a taking clause claim is unavailable. Such a claim exists only
if the government deprives a contractor of a remedy or subjects
him to an additional obligation for which the parties have not bar-
gained. Although this issue primarily involves a question of con-
tract law rather than constitutional law, the former is worthy of
consideration because proper analysis can avoid problematic con-
stitutional issues.
A finding of an impairment of the right to contract, does not,
however, end our inquiry. A court must still consider the public's
interest in overriding the private contract right. This Article con-
siders the proper scope of judicial review-for it is this part of the
analysis that raises the ultimate question of constitutionality-and
the need for, and the proper elements of, a balancing of public and
private interests. This author concludes that the traditional rule
permitting any exercise of the police power to override the private
or contract clause interest should be replaced with a consideration
of (a) the effect of changed circumstances on the public viewpoint
and (b) the respect given the private claim in solving the public
problem. A court should permit only a statute that responds to
changed circumstances and gives due regard to the private interest
to override the contract clause prohibition against impairment.
The ultimate conclusion of this analysis is that the contract
clause promotes a specific and beneficial national policy and that it
can be applied in a way that furthers that policy without unduly
interfering with state attempts to deal with changing economic
problems. In short, the similarity between traditional contract
clause doctrine and substantive due process18 has led to the prema-
ture rejection of a useful constitutional provision.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MARSHALL CONTRACT CLAUSE
The contract clause was the. primary constitutional restraint
on state and local regulation of business until the late 19th century
because it was the only provision of the Constitution that could be
construed as a restriction on state interference with property
rights.19 As the Supreme Court began to apply the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to economic regulation, the
18. Professor Hale recognized that the clauses were so similar that "the results might
be the same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitution, and the challenged
statutes all judged as reasonable or unreasonable deprivations of property." Hale, supra
note 5, at 890-91.
19. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 268.
19851
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
importance of the contract clause gradually diminished.2 0
The judicial history of the clause is especially interesting be-
cause the Framers of the Constitution apparently intended it to
serve the limited purpose of preventing the states from adopting
debtor-relief laws.2' State statutes that delayed maturities, gave
debtors the right to make payments in installments and permitted
payments in property other than specie were quite common and
had the effect of disrupting the growth of commerce.2 2 Whether
the Framers intended the clause to apply solely to such measures,
however, is not clear. The Framers adopted it virtually without
discussion and gave it only brief mention in the debates.2"
The inclusion of the contract clause in section 10 of article I of
the Constitution supports both a narrow and a broad interpreta-
tion of its meaning. Justice Brennan has argued that the proximity
of the clause to provisions preventing the states from emitting bills
of credit or requiring anything other than specie as legal tender
indicates that the clause was limited to striking down debtor-relief
measures.2 ' Justice Black, on the other hand, argued that the in-
clusion of the clause in proximity to the prohibitions on ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder reflects the strong belief of the
Framers that men should not have to act with the risk that the
government may change its mind and alter the legal consequences
of their past acts.26 Perhaps because the legislative history of the
clause is so ambiguous, the Court's majority has given scant atten-
tion to the Framers' intent in the leading modern cases construing
the clause.2 6 The dissent in these cases, however, has deemed the
20. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 268;
WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 91-100.
21. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 257 (1978) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (the contract clause should only be applied to debtor-relief laws); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1934). For an alternative position on the
Framers' intent in creating the contract clause, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 269-70, and
WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 15, who suggest that the Framers were interested in establishing
essential rights of property.
22. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 4.
23. Id. at 8-10; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 113-14.
24. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
25. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 522 (Black, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 380 U.S.
926 (1965).
26. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 427 (1934).
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Framers' intent to be unequivocal and worthy of discussion."'
The importance of the contract clause in our constitutional
history is due not to the Framers but to Chief Justice John Mar-
shall. Marshall seized upon the clause as the only means available
to the Supreme Court to prevent state interference with property
rights."8 The lack of debate at the Constitutional Convention may
show that the Framers unanimously viewed the clause as a funda-
mental provision of the Constitution, but Marshall extended the
clause far beyond what the Framers could have envisioned. Profes-
sor Schwartz has concluded that Marshall's holding in Fletcher v.
Peck"e-that the contract clause applies to contracts between a
state and private citizens30-was a "creative act of the first magni-
tude and one which resulted in a virtual metamorphosis of the or-
ganic provision."3 1
Marshall made two other primary contributions to the vitality
of the clause. First, he ruled in Sturges v. Crowninshield that laws
in effect at the time parties enter into a contract become part of
the contract and cannot be repealed or amended without impairing
its obligation.3" Secondly, he held in Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward 3 that corporate charters are a contract between
the corporation and the state. The latter holding has been credited
with contributing much to the development of the American econ-
omy by freeing the corporate entity from arbitrary state interfer-
ence, thereby facilitating the accumulation of capital necessary to
support economic growth."
27. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 256-57 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 521-22 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g denied,
380 U.S. 926 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 454-65 (Suther-
land, J., dissenting).
28. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 271.
29. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
30. Id. at 136-37.
31. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 274.
32. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197-200 (1819). The development
of the police power doctrine minimized the importance of this rule. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 42-47.
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812),
often cited as an important Marshall contract clause decision, held that the clause prohib-
ited New Jersey from revoking a tax exemption granted to the plaintiff's predecessor in
title. The "rule of strict construction," however, limits this case to its facts. United States
Trust, 431 U.S. at 51 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (although Wilson has not been over-
ruled, modern cases avoid its holding and reasoning). Marshall himself soon limited the
decision by holding that a permanent exemption can never be implied. Providence Bank v.
Billings, 29 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 299; WRIGHT,
supra note 5, at 53.
34. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 278.
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Marshall was not completely successful in extending the con-
tract clause to the extent he desired. In Ogden v. Saunders,"3 he
was outvoted on the issue of whether the clause prohibited pro-
spective changes in statutes affecting contracts. If Marshall had
been successful in convincing one other member of the Court that
the state insolvency law at issue in Ogden did not apply to con-
tracts entered into after the state legislature adopted the law, the
contract clause would have protected not only contracts but also
the freedom to contract.3 6 This would have eliminated the need for
the Court to construe the fourteenth amendment as a protection of
the freedom to contract, and the contract clause might have re-
tained its early preeminence.37
The maximum scope of the contract clause was established by
the time Marshall left the Court. From 1842 until 1890, the Court
refined and applied the principles that Marshall had developed to
restrict state regulation of corporations-especially railroads, pub-
lic utilities, and banks.3 8 But more importantly, the pendulum be-
gan to swing toward restriction of the scope of the clause. The
Court held that public contracts must be strictly construed in
favor of the state; 9 that the state cannot bargain away its basic
powers of sovereignty;40 and that public contracts are subject to
the reserved power of the state to amend and repeal. 1
The most significant of these limitations is that a state cannot
bargain away its police power and that every public and private
contract is subject to the proper exercise of that power. The Court
did not firmly establish this rule until 1880 when it held in Stone
v. Mississippi 42 that a state in the exercise of its power to protect
the public morals could revoke a charter to operate a lottery. The
rationale is deceivingly simple. As Chief Justice Waite explained in
Stone, the power is an essential attribute of sovereignty, the very
purpose for which people form a government."3 The people them-
selves cannot bargain away their power to protect the public
35. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
36. This was the only.case in which Marshall was outvoted on a constitutional issue.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 272; WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 241.
37. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 271-72.
38. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 267-68; WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 62-63.
39. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 546-47 (1837).
40. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1879) (police power); West River Bridge
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532-34 (1848) (eminent domain).
41. Miller v. New York, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 488-89 (1873).
42. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
43. Id. at 820.
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health, safety, and morals;44 therefore, a legislature's attempt to do
so is obviously without effect because it is the people's servant,4 5
The Chief Justice then reasoned that "[tihe contracts which the
Constitution protects are those that relate to property rights, not
[to] governmental" rights."" It is a governmental right to suppress
a lottery, and parties to a contract cannot bargain away that right.
The charter that the Mississippi Legislature granted to the lottery
company was not the equivalent of an irrevocable contractual right
to operate the lottery for twenty-five years. Instead, the company
had a mere license to operate the lottery until the people or the
legislature determined otherwise.47
The "police power doctrine" established in Stone signalled the
end of the significance of the contract clause. Soon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment eclipsed the clause as the pri-
mary restraint on economic regulation." The Court relied primar-
ily upon the police power doctrine to uphold statutes, even though
a narrower basis of decision would have been more suitable. For
example, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Goldsboro49 involved a
claim by a railroad that its franchise to use a street for its tracks
prevented the city from regulating the times during which it used
the tracks for shifting cars. The Court could have relied upon the
rule that it will strictly construe public contracts in favor of the
state. Instead, the Court based its decision upholding the ordi-
nance on the police power doctrine, stating that it was settled that
the contract clause does not override state police power and that
such power cannot be bargained away."'
After Atlantic Coast Line, a regulation exceeds the legitimate
bounds of the police power and therefore violates the contract
clause only if it does not in any way "promote the health, comfort,
safety, or welfare of the community, or ... [if] the means em-
44. This Article uses the shorthand "police power" to describe the government's power
to protect the public health, safety, and morals. Whether it is possible to beneficially define
the police power more precisely is debatable, but such a definition is not necessary for this
discussion. The necessary inquiry is what is the effect of a purported exercise of the power
on protected rights.
45. Stone, 101 U.S. at 819.
46. Id. at 820.
47. Id. at 821.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. The Supreme Court decided a surpris-
ingly large number of cases under the contract clause between 1890 and 1934, but they
tended to be relatively insignificant applications of past holdings to slightly variant fact
patterns. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 95-100.
49. 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
50. Id. at 558.
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ployed have no real and substantial relation to the avowed or os-
tensible purpose, or . . . [if] there is wanton or arbitrary interfer-
ence with private rights."51
The vitality of the traditional contract clause doctrine thus
waned in the early years of this century, and in 1934 its death
knell sounded. In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blais-
dell, 2 the leading modern case on the contract clause, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Minnesota mortgage moratorium
law. The statute under attack was a Depression measure that per-
mitted a court to extend the time during which a debtor could re-
deem his mortgaged property from a foreclosure sale if the debtor
paid the mortgagee the income or rental value of the property dur-
ing the interim period.58 Chief Justice Hughes briefly reviewed the
history of the contract clause and summarized the meaning of the
clause as follows: "The obligations of a contract are impaired by a
law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them
. . . and impairment. . . has been predicated of laws which with-
out destroying contracts derogate from substantial contractual
rights."5 4
The Chief Justice stated that the challenged statute basically
affected a mortgagee's remedy rather than its rights under the con-
tract, but he refused to base his decision on the right/remedy dis-
tinction that the Court had employed so often in previous contract
clause cases." Nor did the emergency created by the Depression by
itself justify the impairment." Rather, the Chief Justice based his
decision on the police power doctrine. After reviewing the police
power cases, he stated that the "question is not whether the legis-
lative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly,
but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."5
The statute at issue in Blaisdell was valid under this test. It
did not impair the basic obligation of the mortgagor to pay the full
amount of his debt; it simply changed the time of payment. The
statute was addressed to a broad economic problem that had
51. Id. at 559.
52. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
53. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416-18; see Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, ch. 339,
1933 Laws of Minn. 514.
54. Blaisdel, 290 U.S. at 431 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 429-31; see El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-07 n.9, reh'g denied, 380
U.S. 926 (1965). But see id. at 524-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426, 444-45.
57. Id. at 438.
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reached emergency proportions, and the state legislature tailored it
to meet the needs of that problem and emergency. It indicated a
concern for both mortgagor and mortgagee and provided for a pro-
cedure under the supervision of the court. 8
The Court's broad language in Blaisdell signified the death of
Marshallian contract clause analysis, but it did not mark the death
of the contract clause. In several subsequent cases during the
1930's, the Court struck down Depression debtor-relief statutes
that were not as carefully drafted as the statute in Blaisdell.59
With the possible exception of W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,60
however, these cases did not involve any doctrinal advances.
Not until 1965 did another significant contract clause case
come before the Court. El Paso v. Simmons61 arose out of Texas's
public land program, under which the state sold land on long-term
contracts with the proceeds going to a public school fund. In 1910,
Simmons's predecessors in title had purchased land near El Paso
from the state pursuant to a statute that provided for forfeiture of
the land to the state in the event of nonpayment of interest due
under the contract of sale. The statute also provided that, in the
event of forfeiture, the purchaser or his vendee could reinstate his
claim by requesting reinstatement in writing and paying the past
due interest, provided that no third party rights had intervened. In
1941, the state legislature amended the statute to provide that the
purchaser or his vendee must exercise his reinstatement right
within five years from the date the property was forfeited. Sim-
mons took quitclaim deeds to the property at issue after it was
forfeited in 1947, but the State of Texas turned down his request
for reinstatement because it came more than five years after the
forfeiture. In 1955, the state sold the land to El Paso by special
legislation, and Simmons sued to determine title.62
Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Black,63 the Court held that
the modification of the reinstatement provision did not contravene
the contract clause. 4 Justice White, writing for the majority, based
the decision on the police power doctrine. He compared the
58. Id. at 445-46.
59. See, e.g., Triegle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); W.B. Worthen Co.
v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934). For a
discussion of these cases, see WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 98-99.
60. 295 U.S. 56 (1935); see infra note 317 (discussing the doctrinal aspects of the case).
61. 379 U.S. 497, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965).
62. Id. at 498-501.
63. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 509.
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problems that Texas faced in administering a land program that
had become a vehicle for speculation with the ancillary nature of
the reinstatement right in view of the original purposes of the state
program." The five-year limitation on reinstatement furthered sig-
nificant interests of the state and merely prevented speculative
purchasers from reaping windfall profits. The limitation protected
the legitimate expectations of bona fide purchasers. 6 In short, in
light of the changed goals of the public land program and past ef-
forts to improve administration, the contract clause did not forbid
an "effective and necessary" measure that imposed only a mild
burden on legitimate buyers.6 7
El Paso signified to virtually every commentator that
whatever viability was left in the contract clause after Blaisdell
was gone." The rule appeared to be that a law that is a legitimate
exercise of the police power necessarily overrides contract obliga-
tions. As Professor Schwartz stated, "This has more than ever re-
moved the Contract Clause as an obstacle to government author-
ity, only emphasizing its contemporary redundant status as a fifth
wheel on the constitutional law coach." 9
III. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE BURGER COURT
A. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey
The controversy in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey70
was whether New York and New Jersey could use revenues that
the New York Port Authority generated (pursuant to a compact
between the two states) to develop a rapid transit system despite
the fact that the states had pledged those revenues to holders of
certain bonds that the Port Authority issued.7' The states adopted
legislation in 1962 authorizing the Port Authority to acquire and
operate the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad. In the statute, the
states "agreed" with bondholders and the Port Authority that, as
long as the bonds were outstanding, neither the states nor the Port
Authority would apply any revenues that the states had pledged as
security for the bonds to any railroad purposes other than to the
65. Id. at 512, 515.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 516-17.
68. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 306: "Whenever a law is legitimate under the
police power, it is one that must necessarily override the obligations of contracts." Id.
69. Id.
70. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
71. Id. at 3.
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acquisition and operation of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad.
The need for rapid mass transit between New York and New
Jersey became more imperative in the 1970's, however, and pres-
sure began to build to repeal the 1962 covenant. In 1973, the New
York and New Jersy Legislatures repealed the covenant for bonds
issued after that date. But continually escalating estimates of the
costs of the rapid transit project led the states in 1974 to repeal
the 1962 covenant with respect to all bonds.
U.S. Trust, as trustee for some of the bondholders and as an
owner of bonds in its own right, sued New Jersey for a declaratory
judgment that the repeal of the 1962 covenant violated the con-
tract clause. After a lengthy trial, the New Jersey Superior Court
upheld the repeal.7 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed 8
and U.S. Trust Co. appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States.7" The Court reversed, holding the repeal unconstitutional.7 5
The United States Trust plurality opinion is the starting
point for an analysis of the revitalized contract clause.7 Justice
Blackmun's opinion recognized that Blaisdell and El Paso had se-
verely limited the scope of the clause and that they "largely illumi-
nated" its present role." He then proceeded, however, to a detailed
analysis of impairment and justification that is inconsistent with
the spirit and results of those cases.
The first question was whether the repeal of the 1962 covenant
impaired the obligation of the Port Authority's bonds. The Court
found an "impairment" because the repeal had not merely modi-
fied or replaced the covenant with a comparable security provision.
Instead, it had totally eliminated the covenant.78 Blaisdell, how-
72. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975).
73. United States Trust Co. v. State, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976).
74. United Trust Co. of New York instituted similar litigation in New York challenging
the parallel New York statute. That litigation was still pending in the Supreme Court of
New York at the time of the Supreme Court's decision. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 4
n.4.
75. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court, with Chief Justice Burger writ-
ing a short concurring opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Jus-
tices White and Marshall. Justice Blackmun's opinion did not have a concurrence of a ma-
jority of the Court because Justices Stewart and Powell did not participate.
76. The following discussions of United States Trust and Spannaus are merely de-
scriptive and are set forth primarily to set the stage for an analysis of the Court's 1983
decisions. To reduce repetition, criticism of the two decisions is deferred until the discussion
of Energy Reserves v. Kansas Power & Light Co., infra notes 106-40 and accompanying
text, and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text, and the sub-
sequent analysis of the scope of the contract clause.
77. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 14-16.
78. Id. at 19.
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ever, recognized that not every impairment violates the contract
clause, so that the finding of a "technical impairment is merely a
preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question of whether
that impairment is permitted under the Constitution.""9
Justice Blackmun reasoned that the constitutional impairment
issue requires a reconciliation of the contract clause with the "es-
sential attributes of sovereign power."8 0 The scope of the state's
reserved power depends on the nature of the contractual relation-
ship with which the challenged law conflicts. If the contractual re-
lationship is between two private parties, the sole criterion is
whether the exercise of the police power is reasonable-and great
deference must be given to the legislature's judgment.
When a state impairs its own contractual obligation, however,
"the reserved-powers doctrine has a different basis."81 An initial
inquiry that must be made is whether the state had the power to
create an irrevocable contract in the first place. Whether the con-
tract involves the taxing, spending, or police power is not disposi-
tive; however, if a state has assumed "financial obligations" under
a contract, those obligations are clearly binding.82 The 1962 cove-
nant was a financial obligation because it related solely to the use
of revenues. 83 Therefore, it was validly adopted and binding on
New Jersey as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Justice Blackmun then returned to the issue of constitutional
impairment. A statute that "technically" impairs a contract does
not "constitutionally" impair it if the statute is reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose.8 ' This impairment
standard is the same for both private and public contracts once a
court determines that the Constitution protects the contract; but,
where a public contract is involved, "complete deference to a legis-
lative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropri-
ate because the State's self-interest is at stake."85 The impairment
79. Id. at 21. The minority contested the finding. Justice Brennan argued that the cove-
nant was not important to the bondholders and that its repeal did not deprive them of a
valuable right. Id. at 41-42.
80. Id. at 21 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 426, 435 (1934)).
81. Id. at 23.
82. Id. at 24-25.
83. Id. at 25. According to Justice Blackmun, not every "security provision" is necessa-
rily financial. For example, a covenant that would obligate the state to continue operating
the financed facility could not be construed to prevent the state from closing it for health or
safety reasons. Id. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra note 282 and ac-
companying text.
84. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25.
85. Id. at 25-26.
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is not justified merely because the benefits to be derived from the
repeal are greater than the cost to the bondholders.8 6 Blackmun
argued that the focus is solely on the impairment's effect on the
contract, not upon the purposes of the impairment.
Realizing that he was breaking new ground, Justice Blackmun
explained the nature of the "reasonable and necessary" test. An
impairment is necessary if (a) the legislature's purpose cannot be
accomplished by impairment in a less drastic fashion, and (b) al-
ternative means of achieving the legislature's purpose without im-
pairment are not available.87 Here, the states' total repeal of the
1962 covenant was not essential. Alternative means were available
for dealing with the need for mass rapid transit without affecting
the bondholders' rights.
The repeal was not only unnecessary, it was unreasonable. The
"unreasonableness" test is whether the reason for the impairment
was foreseeable in light of the surrounding circumstances at the
time the contract was made.88 The plurality believed El Paso was
distinguishable because in that case, Texas could not have known,
when the contract was made with Simmons's predecessors, that the
discovery of oil would make the reinstatement rights so valuable.
New Jersey was obviously aware of the problems of congestion and
pollution when it made the 1962 covenant. In fact, the covenant
did not have a substantially different impact in 1974 than it had in
1962.80 Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion stressing
that a state must show that the impairment was essential to
achieve an important public purpose, and that the state did not
and could not know the impact of the contract on that state inter-
est at the time the contract was made.90
Brennan argued in dissent against both the policy and the
doctrine of the Court's opinion.91 In his view, the Court had pre-
vented New Jersey from dealing with an urgent matter of public
health and safety even though the bondholders had suffered no
real injury. To impose a more stringent scope of review with re-
spect to public contracts was contrary not only to the Framers' in-
86. The Court rejected the "invitation to engage in a utilitarian comparison of public
benefit and private loss." Id. at 29. In light of Spannaus and Energy Reserves, this point is
particularly significant. See infra Section VII B.
87. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 29-30.
88. Id. at 31-32.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 32-33.
91. Id. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White and Marshall joined Justice
Brennan in dissent.
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tent but also to the thrust of constitutional doctrine in the 20th
century relating to the adverse claims of property owners. The
"reasonable and necessary" standard could only lead to confusion
because those terms generally refer in constitutional law to oppos-
ing standards of judicial review. Such confusion, Brennan argued,
could only lead to judges deciding cases in accordance with their
individual inclinations.2
In summary, United States Trust made four doctrinal state-
ments, two of which were innovative. First, it reaffirmed that the
contract clause will proscribe even a minor change in contractual
rights if it is not adequately justified. Secondly, it clarified the
limit on the police power doctrine-at least financial contracts
with a state are binding. Third, it established a new "reasonable
and necessary" test to determine impairment with respect to both
public and private contracts. Finally, it established a stricter stan-
dard of review for public contracts. Courts will not defer to legisla-
tive judgment when the state's self-interest is at stake. Whether
these innovations would make a difference when a statute affected
private contracts remained to be seen.
B. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus
In an effort to protect the legitimate expectations of Minne-
sota employees covered by pension plans, Minnesota enacted a
statute requiring any employer that had adopted a pension plan
for its employees and then terminated its operations in Minnesota
to immediately fund the plan for all employees with ten or more
years of service." Allied Structural Steel had adopted a pension
plan before the Minnesota Legislature passed the statute and later
closed its Minnesota plant. Allied's pension plan did not provide
for immediate funding or for one hundred percent vesting at the
end of ten years. When the Minnesota Commissioner of Labor and
Industry notified Allied that it owed a funding charge of approxi-
mately $185,000 (that it would not have been required to make had
the statute not been passed),' Allied brought suit in federal court
challenging the statute's constitutionality.
Justice Stewart, on behalf of the majority, held in a rather
short and elliptical opinion that the statute violated the contract
clause. Although he cited Blaisdell and United States Trust, he
92. Id. at 54-55 n.17.
93. Minn. Stat. §§ 181B.01-181B.17 (1974) (private pension benefits protection statute).
94. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 239 (1978).
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appeared to take an entirely different approach to Allied's consti-
tutional claim. His first inquiry was whether the state law substan-
tially impaired a contractual relationship. 5 A "[m]inimal altera-
tion of contractual obligations might end the inquiry at its first
stage," as was the case in El Paso, but a "[s]evere impairment...
pushes the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and pur-
pose of the state legislation."9' Stewart reasoned that "the severity
of an impairment . . . can be measured by the factors that reflect
the high value the Framers placed on the protection of private con-
tracts.1917 One such factor is the right to rely on legitimate contrac-
tual expectations free from retroactive changes in obligations.
Applying this analysis to the facts, Justice Stewart found that
the Minnesota statute was a severe impairment:
By simply proceeding to close its office in Minnesota, a move
that had been planned before the passage of the Act, the com-
pany was assessed an immediate pension funding charge of ap-
proximately $185,000.
Thus, the statute in question here nullifies express terms of
the company's contractual obligations and imposes a completely
unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts.98
The company had relied heavily on the terms of the plan and on
the lack of any state regulation when it adopted and implemented
the plan.99
Justice Stewart then considered whether "this severe disrup-
tion of contractual expectations" was necessary to meet an impor-
tant general social problem.' He found that the Minnesota pen-
sion law did not satisfy the requirements imposed by the Court in
Blaisdell, other Depression contract clause cases, and United
States Trust.'0' First, the statute applied to an extremely narrow
class of employers-those who had been "enlightened enough" to
adopt pension plans for their employees and, within that class,
those who terminated operations in the state. °'0 The statute also
acted in an area where there had been no prior state regulation of
95. Id. at 244.
96. Id. at 245.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 247.
99. Id. at 246.
100. Id. at 247.
101. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (Blaisdell and other Depression
contract clause cases); supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text (analyzing United States
Trust).
102. Id. at 248.
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any type, and it worked a severe and permanent change in the re-
lations between the parties to the contract. 08
The opinion made no attempt to further define the doctrinal
basis of the decision. By stressing the factors that distinguished
Blaisdell and El Paso rather than applying the United States
Trust test, Stewart seemed to be reverting to pre-United States
Trust analysis. His reference to the "height of the hurdle" that
state legislation must clear implies the balancing approach that
Justice Blackmun rejected in United States Trust. In short, the
Spannaus approach is much like that of Blaisdell and El Paso, but
its result is more compatible with United States Trust.10 4
Justice Brennan again wrote a dissent in which Justices White
and Marshall joined. He argued primarily that the contract clause
applies only when a statute diminishes the efficacy of an obligation
owed to the constitutional claimant; it does not apply to new du-
ties that legislation has imposed. The latter, he claimed, are to be
treated under the due process clause. Because the plaintiff's claim
-raised an issue only under the due process clause, Brennan ana-
lyzed the statute under the traditional rational basis test and
found that it passed constitutional muster. 0 5
C. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
Five years passed between Spannaus and the Court's next
contract clause decision. Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co.'0e involved a dispute between a public utility,
Kansas Power and Light (Utility), and an oil and gas company,
Energy Reserves Group (ERG), over the application and interpre-
tation of "governmental price escalation" clauses in two intrastate
contracts for the sale of natural gas. The clauses permitted ERG to
increase the price if a governmental authority permitted higher
103. Id. at 250.
104. Spannaus is distinctly reminiscent of Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S.
189 (1936), which seemed to indicate the narrow reach of Blaisdell. In Treigle, the Court
struck down a state statute changing the order in which shareholders could withdraw from
the building and loan association and receive payment. The statute simply changed private
priorities and did not further public purposes or deal with an emergency. The Supreme
Court, however, virtually overruled Treigle in Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310
U.S. 32 (1940). Faced with a virtually identical statute, the Court found that the state legis-
lature passed the statute to protect the public against the evils of a run on deposits. The
Treigle decision was "based on the factual conclusion that the statute had no public pur-
pose." Id. at 41. The breadth and vitality of Blaisdell were thus reaffirmed.
105. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
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prices.
In 1978, the federal government for the first time extended
federal price regulation to gas sold in intrastate commerce. The
federal "maximum price" was approximately seventeen percent
higher than the current Utility-ERG price. 10 In response to the
federal action, Kansas adopted legislation that in effect prohibited
ERG and Utility from considering ceiling prices that the federal
authorities set or prices paid under other contracts in Kansas in
setting prices under their price escalation or price determination
clauses. 108 The Kansas legislation therefore precluded ERG from
raising its price to meet the market, which was the purpose of the
clauses, and from terminating the contracts, which was its remedy
if Utility did not agree to increases.
The Supreme Court of Kansas rejected ERG's contract clause
claim on the grounds that an emergency existed and that Kansas
had a legitimate interest in controlling the "economic dislocation"
that a sharp increase in gas prices would cause. The Court con-
cluded that the means chosen to achieve that interest-namely,
the postponement of price increases-were reasonable.' 0 9
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously af-
firmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas. Justice
Blackmun, the author of the plurality opinion in United States
Trust, wrote the opinion of the Court. Blackmun began his discus-
sion of the contract clause claim by stating that the Blaisdell court
had balanced the language of the clause against the state's police
power interest.110 This is a curious balancing notion. Balancing is a
method of deciding constitutional claims on a case-by-case basis,
whereby the specific interests that the competing doctrines protect
are balanced. Such a balancing test requires consideration of the
state's interest as opposed to the private interest affected by the
statute. Under Justice Blackmun's balancing test, however, the
Court balances the constitutional doctrines themselves. Justice
Blackmun's rule of law, like that adopted in Stone v. Mississippi
or El Paso, subordinates the contract clause to the police power.
107. Id. at 415 n.21 and 417 n.24. The contract price was $1.77; the federal maximum
price for intrastate gas was $3.152. Id.
108. The federal maximum price for interstate gas (the maximum permitted by the
Kansas statute) was $2,194. Id. The maximum rate permitted by the Kansas statute was
twenty-four percent over the contract price, but the statute delayed the effective date of the
full increase. Id. at 407-08.
109. Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light, 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142
(1981).
110. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983).
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The Court's use of precedent in explaining the impairment is-
sue indicates that foreseeability is the determining factor."' Jus-
tice Blackmun stated that it is not an impairment to restrict a
party to its reasonable expectations and, in determining those ex-
pectations, the courts must consider to what extent the state and
federal governments have regulated the subject matter." 2
The regulation aspect was extremely important in Energy
Reserves.'" When ERG and Utility entered into the contracts,
Kansas supervised the industry and the federal government con-
trolled interstate prices. Kansas did not control intrastate prices
between producers and utilities, but its authority over consumer
prices apparently limited the utilities' willingness to accept price
escalation clauses. Moreover, federal regulation of interstate prices
kept a ceiling on intrastate prices.' 1 4 The fact that the parties had
agreed that all contract terms were subject to changes in federal
and state law was especially significant. ERG seemed to have taken
the risk that what deregulation gave, later regulation could take.
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Kansas Act had not im-
paired ERG's reasonable expectations." 5 The Court used the im-
pairment concept as it did in United States Trust, wherein the
preliminary question was whether the state must justify its action
and not whether the state had violated the contract clause. ERG
was not entitled to any benefit from federal deregulation because it
had not bargained for that right.116 Therefore, there was no impair-
ment-"substantial" or "technical."
Indeed, the state law problems facing ERG on the interpreta-
tion and impairment issues were severe enough that Justice Pow-
111. 459 U.S. at 411.
112. Id. In this respect, the approach of Energy Reserves is identical to Justice White's
in El Paso. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
113. See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 413-14 nn.15-18 (providing detailed references to
the extent of regulation of natural gas production and sale).
114. Id. at 406. The opinion makes it clear, however, that past regulation in itself is not
determinative. Id. at 415-16. The parties in Energy Reserves drafted the clauses in view of
existing regulation. Although the court did not cite any trial testimony regarding the par-
ties' intent, it found that ERG never intended to get the benefit of "deregulated" prices but
merely of "anticipated increases." Id. at 415.
115. Id. at 416.
116. "Bargained" is used here advisedly. There is no indication that parties must actu-
ally negotiate terms for a claimant to demonstrate that a protected contract right exists.
Rather, it should be enough that the parties have "agreed" on the contract provision. See
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-201(11) (1977). Although the opinion is not explicit on this point, an
argument could be made that the clause was unenforceable against Utility under the doc-
trine of failure of presupposed conditions, even in the absence of the Kansas statute. U.C.C.
§ 2-615 & comment 9 (excuse by failure of presupposed conditions).
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ell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, deter-
mined that the lack of impairment was dispositive as a matter of
contract law.' 17 Justice Powell, therefore, refused to join that part
of the Court's opinion that considered the significance of the
state's interests.11 8
The Court's opinion, however, did proceed to the second part
of the contract clause equation, with less than satisfactory results.
The rule adopted is that "[i]f the state regulation constitutes a
substantial impairment, the State . . . must have a significant and
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation."'1 9 If the Court
really meant that both the legitimacy and importance of the state's
interest are relevant, the test under the contract clause is more
stringent than the due process rational basis test.120 The Court's
opinion indicates that two types of state interests may satisfy the
test. The first is one that remedies a "broad and general" social
problem. 1 The broad/general qualification is intended to ensure
that "the state is exercising its police power, rather than providing
a benefit to special interest.'1 2
The problem with such a test is that the language is so impre-
cise that it would apply to most legislation.' 23 The impetus for leg-
117. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
118. Justice Blackmun's only response to the separate opinion is an indirect one. See
id. at 410 n.10. The note does not relate directly to the impairment issue but instead to the
effect of the federal deregulation statute.
119. Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983)
(citing United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22).
120. The use of "significant" necessarily implies some notion of balancing. The due
process rational basis test demands "that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). Under this
test, the legislature enjoys a presumption of validity while the challenger faces a substantial
burden of proof. In the realm of economic due process, the presumption of constitutionality
was given perhaps its fullest expression in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
15 (1975) ("It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and
that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legis-
lature has acted in an arbitrary an irrational way."). See also United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) ("regulatory legislation. . . is not to be pronounced un-
constitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such
a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis").
121. Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)
(citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247, 250 (1978)).
122. Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983).
123. The Court attempted to explain and limit the concept in a footnote discussing
Spannaus. See Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13
(1983). The footnote, however, simply overstates the Spannaus facts in a conclusory fashion
that would deprive the decision of all meaning. The legislation in Spannaus may have been
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islation is frequently the "bad apple" case-that is, a case that
represents one incident rather than a widespread problem. More-
over, legislatures pass virtually all legislation, as Judge Posner ar-
gues, 24 to benefit a "special interest." Who else would work for its
passage? Legislation is seldom neutral, and those who benefit,
whether it be consumers, big business, labor, farmers or utilities,
can be termed "special interests." Only if the Court's concept
means that the many can oppress the few but that the few cannot
oppress the many, does it have much meaning. That meaning,
however, would turn the contract clause on its historical head. Af-
ter all, the primary purpose of the clause was to prevent debtor
classes from passing special interest legislation to relieve them of
the burden of their debts.
The second type of legitimate state purpose that the Energy
Reserves Court recognized is the "elimination of unforeseen wind-
fall profits."' 20 Such a purpose is, of course, consistent with general
contract law because it rests on the assumption that bargains do
not contemplate the unforeseeable."2 6 It is a contradiction to state
that a windfall was a risk a party assumed or that a court in en-
forcing a contract is awarding true windfall profits. Therefore, leg-
islation that is intended to do no more than eliminate windfalls is
consistent with the contract clause. This is so because such legisla-
tion seeks to ensure the integrity (some would say the sanctity) of
contracts by not permitting enforcement or abrogation to depend
on unforeseen events or the other party's political power.
Energy Reserves recognizes that legislation supported by a le-
gitimate state purpose cannot ride roughshod over contractual in-
terests. In United States Trust, the Court phrased the test as
whether the legislation is "reasonable" and "appropriate,' 127 but
Energy Reserves makes it clear that deference to the legislature
where the state is not party to the contract is as complete as under
the rational basis test. 2'
Thus, it appears from Energy Reserves that much of the bite
complex and of narrow application, but it was not atypical in origin.
124. Posner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49
U. Cu. L. REV. 263 (1982).
125. 459 U.S. at 412 (citing United States Trust Court's discussion of El Paso).
126. Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (damages for breach of contract
must arise naturally from the breach or must have reasonably been in contemplation of both
parties at time of contracting); Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903) (impossibility of
performance).
127. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22.
128. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 418-19.
[Vol. 39:183
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
of the contract clause may be gone. Although Justice Blackmun
has not recanted his United States Trust position, his latest con-
tract clause opinion in Energy Reserves indicates that his former
position will be limited to the public contract arena. 29 Blackmun's
current position may result from his shift to the Brennan-Marshall
camp 30 and not from a reluctance on the Court's part to experi-
ment with new standards of review. Presuming that the Court has
not given up on the ghost of United States Trust, it is the primary
purpose of this Article to urge that the Court should not allow
United States Trust to be a mere phantom on the constitutional
scene, but rather that the Court should clarify what state interests
justify an impairment.
Energy Reserves, however, gives little hope that any such re-
finement is forthcoming. The Court first cited Kansas's need to
protect its consumers as the state purpose justifying the statute."3
The issue before the Energy Reserves Court, however, was which
party to the gas contract should bear the original incidence of de-
regulation and reregulation. The issue did not concern consumers.
The other state purpose the Energy Reserves Court relied on
was Kansas's interest in correcting the imbalance between intra-
state and interstate prices. "' The federal statute created the
anomalous possibility that Kansas citizens would have to pay more
for Kansas gas than for Oklahoma gas. One can see why Justice
Powell thought that the Court should not reach the justification
issue.133 The Court's opinion left solid ground on the impairment
issue only to fall into quicksand on the issue of legitimate purpose.
Kansas clearly has an interest in seeing that its citizens do not pay
more for Kansas gas than out-of-state consumers do. But the issue
in this case was much narrower: Does ERG or Utility bear the loss
from unanticipated deregulation? Or, to put it in contract clause
terms, can a state determine by legislation which of two parties to
a contract must bear the risk of an unanticipated event? The
Court, relying on the Congressional Conference Report explaining
the federal act,"' established the legitimacy of Kansas's purpose,
thereby at least hinting that a state may so allocate the risk of an
129. Justice Blackmun is careful to distinguish the public contract situation. Id. at 412
n.14.
130. Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717, 717
(1983).
131. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 417.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 417 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
134. Id. at 421.
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unanticipated event.
The Court, having hinted at the answer, should have deter-
mined whether ERG's profits would in fact be a windfall. Even if
ERG or Utility did not in fact expect deregulation when they exe-
cuted the contracts in 1975, the Court should have decided the is-
sue of whether deregulation was foreseeable.
The Court was even more deferential in its review of the rec-
ord part of the United States Trust test: the reasonableness of the
means by which Kansas corrected the imbalance between intra-
state and interstate prices.13 5 As indicated above, even if one as-
sumes the validity of a proconsumer purpose, the statute did not
achieve this purpose in a manner that was least harmful to ERG's
contract interest.13 6 There may have been cogent reasons why Kan-
sas decided not to make Utility bear the price burden, but the
Court did not even investigate those reasons. The Court merely
pointed out that "on the surface" the Act affected less than ten
percent of the natural gas consumed in Kansas and that the scope
of the Act was limited to intrastate contracts with indefinite esca-
lators.1 -3 7 In short, the statute satisfied the means requirement be-
cause it simply completed price regulation of the gas market by
imposing gradual escalation mechanisms on the intrastate market
consistent with national policy.
There can be little argument with the notion that simply grad-
uating price increases is a reasonable method of dealing with the
problem of deregulation once the power to "impair" the contract is
established. The Court approved the same approach with respect
to mortgages in Blaisdell.38 But the Court in Energy Reserves was
avoiding the real issue. The narrow scope of the Kansas statute
was not relevant to the question of the reasonableness of the stat-
ute because no claim was made that it was overbroad. Indeed,
ERG argued that the Kansas Legislature passed the statute for
135. Id. at 412-13, 416-17.
136. The "least harmful" concept, that was implicit in Blaisdell, was made explicit in
United States Trust. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 29-30; supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text. The only difference between United States Trust and Energy Reserves
on this issue is the degree of deference to be given to the legislature's judgment. Of course,
without explicit findings by the legislature as to alternative means, the Court is left to draw
its own conclusions. Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Alaska dividend distribution
of mineral income fund violated equal protection clause). The difference between a less
strict standard of review and greater deference to legislative judgment is chimerical. At least
part of the Court has recognized this in the equal protection area. See Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 239 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
137. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 418.
138. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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Utility's benefit.139 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that the
Governor, organized labor, farmers, and municipal representatives
supported the bill, and both Houses of the Kansas Legislature
passed it by a wide margin. 14 0 Presumably, the statute promoted
the interest of others in addition to that of Utility.
The Court's emphasis on the narrow scope of the legislation is
particularly interesting because it tended to show that the legisla-
tion was not aimed at a broad social problem and that there was
therefore no "legitimate state purpose." There is an inherent ten-
sion between showing that the problem is important enough to af-
fect contracts and that the legislation is narrow enough to preclude
significant impairment of the constitutionally protected right to
contract. Apparently, only legislation that satisfies both criteria
can survive a contract clause challenge.
D. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton"4 also involved the oil and gas in-
dustry. An Alabama statute increased the severance tax on oil and
gas extracted from wells in the state, but exempted royalty owners
from the increase and prohibited producers such as Exxon from
passing on the increases to consumers. Exxon and other oil compa-
nies claimed that this "pass-through prohibition" was invalid
under the supremacy clause with respect to sales of gas in inter-
state commerce and that both the royalty owner exemption and
the pass-through prohibition violated the contract clause. 1 2 The
Supreme Court of Alabama held the act valid in its entirety."' The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed on the preemption
issue with respect to interstate commerce but affirmed on the con-
tract clause issue, holding that the statute was valid as applied to
contracts for intrastate shipment. 4'
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, made short
shrift of the argument that the royalty owner exemption violated
the clause. The oil and gas leases in effect when the Alabama Leg-
islature passed the statute provided that the producers and royalty
owners would bear taxes in proportion to their interests."M Mar-
139. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 407 n.6.
140. Id.
141. 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983).
142.Id. at 2300.
143. Eagerton v. Exchange Oil & Gas Corp., 404 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981).
144. Exxon Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2309.
145. Id. at 2300.
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shall reasoned that the contracts thus permitted the producer to
recover from the royalty owners their share of a tax increase re-
gardless of whether the "legal incidence of the tax increase" fell on
the producer or the royalty owner.14 Because the statute did not
prohibit reimbursement and by its terms dealt only with incidence,
it did not affect any right of the producer. 47 Even if the contract
did not permit the producer to recover the increase, the statute did
not raise a contract clause issue because the contract, not the stat-
ute, created no obligation of the royalty owners to reimburse the
producers for the tax increase. 48 In short, under Marshall's inter-
pretation, the Alabama statute had a neutral effect. Like any stat-
ute, it may have raised the cost of doing business, but it did not
itself shift rights between contracting parties. Thus, the statute did
not even "technically" impair the leases.
The Court found that the pass-through prohibition, however,
did clearly affect the appellants' contract rights because they were
parties to contracts that permitted them to include in their prices
any increase in severance taxes.' 49 The fact, however, that the
pass-through prohibition thus nullified the purchasers' contractual
obligations to reimburse appellants did not in and of itself make
the statute unconstitutional. 5 0 Justice Marshall cited general max-
ims from United States Trust, Spannaus, and 19th and early 20th
century cases, regarding the inherent power of the state to exercise
its police power' 5' and relied principally on two cases from 1937
and 1920 that upheld statutes permitting utility commissions to
change contract rates.'5 2
What makes the case interesting is Marshall's attempt to rec-
146. Id. at 2304 n.9.
147. Id. at 2304-05.
148. Id. at 2304 n.9.
149. Id. at 2305.
150. Id. at 2305-07.
151. Id. at 2305-06.
152. See Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937);
Producers Transp. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 251 U.S. 228 (1920). The Midland Realty opinion
says little more than that utilities have no rights under the clause with respect to rates. The
facts indicate a very weak reliance argument because the utility exercised its option to ex-
tend its service contract with the user after the Missouri Legislature passed the public ser-
vice commission statute under attack was passed. The reliance on Producers Transporta-
tion is misplaced. Justice Van Devanter based his holding on the fact that the claimant was
a common carrier that had obtained its right of way by the exercise of eminent domain and
had therefore devoted its property to public use and regulation. Id. at 231-32; cf. New Ha-
ven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970) (investors in railroads assumed the risk of reorgani-
zation losses when they invested in a public utility); infra note 179. In short, Exxon may
have little impact outside the public utility arena.
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oncile prior police power cases with United States Trust and
Spannaus. The opinion seems to treat legitimate purpose and rea-
sonable means as one concept. Marshall claimed that the statute
was not limited in effect to contract rights but imposed a general
rule that protected consumers from excessive prices resulting from
Exxon's passing on the cost of its tax increase. He further reasoned
that the pass-through prohibitions applied to all contracts, not just
those with provisions permitting pass-throughs "' The adverse ef-
fect on Exxon was "incidental" to its "main effect" of shielding
consumers from the tax increase.""
Marshall distinguished United States Trust and Spannaus on
the ground that they involved statutes whose sole effect was to
change contracts. Marshall's logic leads to the conclusion that a
statute constitutional on its face cannot be unconstitutional as ap-
plied. Because the statute did not deal only with contract obliga-
tions, it could not violate the contract clause. If Exxon is in fact
the Court's new approach, the current test apparently is whether
the effect on contract obligations is "direct" or "incidental" to the
primary purpose of the statute." 5
Marshall's opinion is a typical contract clause opinion in that
it oversimplifies the issues by relying on the police power doctrine.
The purpose of the Alabama statute was to protect consumers
from bearing the financial burden that would result from an oil
company's tax increases. No one questioned Alabama's right or
power to increase severance taxes on oil or even to prohibit sever-
ance altogether. The question was whether Alabama could by stat-
ute affect pre-existing contract rights.1 6 The putative purpose of
the contract clause is to prevent states from adopting exactly this
type of class legislation. 157 If the Alabama Legislature passed a
statute to protect consumers from excessive interest rates and in-
153. Exxon, 103 S. Ct. at 2306.
154. Id.
155. The Court in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), expressly
rejected a direct versus an incidental approach. See id. at 438. In any event the Exxon
approach appears to reduce greatly the significance of the fact that a legislature has regu-
lated heavily the activity that the challenged statute covers. Spannaus and Energy Reserves
both placed heavy emphasis on this factor, but Exxon reduces its importance to a footnote.
103 S. Ct. at 2307 n.14.
156. Justice Marshall noted this distinction in his discussion of the royalty owner ex-
emption. Id. at 2304-05. There the statute's only subject was the incidence of tle tax, not its
ultimate burden.
157. Cf. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 256-57 (1978) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (framers intended contract clause to apply only to laws that impaired con-
tracts by effectively relieving one party of the obligation to perform).
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flation by prohibiting lenders from collecting accrued interest on
existing debts, there could be no doubt that the statute would vio-
late the contract clause. What, then, was different about the pass-
through prohibition? It could be that the Court viewed the statute
as essentially a tax measure; and, although the power to tax is the
power to destroy, the Framers could not have intended the con-
tract clause to interfere with a state's taxing power. Or, it could be
that the statute did not interfere with any reliance interest of the
producers. In short, protection of debtors or consumers at the ex-
pense of other parties to contracts can be, but is not always, a "le-
gitimate" state purpose. Unfortunately, Exxon only adds to the
mystery of when a state purpose is "legitimate."
E. The Contract Clause Today
The Court's 1983 decisions may appear to reinterpret the con-
tract clause, but a closer examination demonstrates that the Court
did not on the facts or reasoning limit either United States Trust
or Spannaus. Moreover, the Court clearly left unresolved most of
the uncertainties that the Burger Court decisions created. Energy
Reserves and Exxon presented garden variety contract clause
claims that probably would have failed under the analyses of
United States Trust and Spannaus. In Energy Reserves, the con-
tract impairment claim was tenuous, and in light of the amount of
government regulation, one would be hard pressed to find any real
reliance argument. 158 In Exxon, one statute did not affect the par-
ties' right to contract at all and the other only tangentially affected
Exxon's rights. The legislation's impact was to simply impose a tax
on Exxon. 159 The contract clause cannot be interpreted to prevent
a state from adopting an obvious revenue measure, the incidence of
which falls on some but not all contract rights. Of course, Energy
Reserves did attempt to cut back on the sweep of Spannaus and
United States Trust, but as the concurring opinion pointed out,
most of the analysis was unnecessary to the decision. 6 0 It remains
to be seen what the Court will do with a case that involves a con-
flict between a reliance interest and an important state policy.
To the extent that they survive Energy Reserves and Exxon,
United States Trust and Spannaus question the constitutionality
158. See supra text accompanying notes 106-40 (discussing the Energy Reserves
decision).
159. See supra text accompanying 141-57.
160. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
[Vol. 39:183
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
of statutes governing a wide range of activities.16' United States
Trust is particularly significant in the public contract arena. On
the one hand, fiscal responsibility measures have forced many state
and local governments to curtail their obligations under long-term
collective bargaining and capital improvement agreements."" On
the other hand, acceptance of public participation in and control
over health care, pollution and waste management, and transporta-
tion and economic development, mean that the complexity and
magnitude of government contracts could present a plethora of
constitutional challenges to legislation affecting those same con-
tracts and projects. Until the Court addresses another public con-
tract case, one must assume that the 1983 decisions have not af-
fected the impact of United States Trust on public contracts.
Although United States Trust may have made the contract
clause more significant in the public contract arena, it would be a
perverse reading of the clause and the police power doctrine to say
that it applies as a practical matter only to public contracts. The
Court has utterly failed to develop a cohesive doctrine that applies
to both public and private contract cases. The remainder of this
Article attempts to fill that void.
IV. CONTRACT RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONTRACT AND TAKING
CLAUSES
A. Contract Rights as Property Rights
United States Trust and Spannaus were criticized because
they seemed to give more constitutional protection to contract
rights than that available to other forms of property. It cannot be
denied, however, that the clause singles out contract rights for spe-
161. The public has attacked many state laws in the federal and state courts. See Con-
tinental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Washington, 696 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1983) (Washington referen-
dum requiring voter approval of bonds to build nuclear power plants); Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 632 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980) (regional land
use plan that allegedly impaired assessment bonds); Morseburg v. Babylon, 621 F.2d 972
(9th Cir. 1980) (California statute requiring payments to artists by remote buyers of fine
art); Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1980) (stat-
ute requiring the deposit of disputed rents into the court registry); Smith Ins. Inc. v. Griev-
ance Comm., 424 A.2d 816 (N.H. 1980) (statute creating a grievance committee for insur-
ance agency terminations); Wipperfurth v. U-Haul of W. Wis., 304 N.W.2d 767 (Wis. 1981)
("fair dealing" law requiring good cause for terminations).
162. Even before United States Trust, the Second Circuit in Koch v. Yunich, 533 F.2d
80 (2d Cir. 1976), rejected a contract clause challenge to a section of the New York Civil
Service Law, which in cases of layoff and demotions for economic reasons, requires termina-
tion by seniority based on original permanent retention in civil service rather than tenure in
positions currently held.
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cial protection. This portion of the Article analyzes the nature of
the contract rights that the contract clause protects.
Any contractual right is property in the sense that it repre-
sents a claim of entitlement to resources of the other party or par-
ties to the contract. The recent Supreme Court decisions and aca-
demic commentary, however, have refined the concept of property
in ways that permit distinctions to be drawn among contract
rights. For example, an inverse condemnation proceeding can be
deended on the ground that the plaintiff had no "property" inter-
est under state law'63 or under the Constitution,' 4 or that any gov-
ernment interference with the "property" interest was insufficient
to constitute a taking.165 All three defenses generally require more
sophisticated concepts of property than the Court has been re-
quired to consider in contract clause cases. That does not mean,
however, that the problems do not exist in contract clause cases.
A person may by contract obtain a particular interest in spe-
cific property of the other contracting party. Such a contract right,
whether it is called a mortgage,1 6 a leasehold e7 or a security inter-
est,1 6 8 is generally thought of as an interest in the specific re-
source-one of the bundle of rights that constitute "ownership."
For that reason, such cases are usually litigated as taking and due
process cases rather than contract clause cases. Yet, Blaisdell and
Fletcher v. Peck demonstrate that the contract clause is clearly
163. See Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982). Inverse condemnation is a cause of
action against a government agency to recover the value of property that the agency took,
although the agency has not completed a formal exercise of the power of eminent domain.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979).
164. See Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097
(1981). But see Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88-89 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). The Court in Pruneyard, upheld a California constitutional provision that ele-
vated free speech interests over the landowner's property interests. Id. at 82. The landowner
had a "property right" to exclude persons but not on the basis of their speech. The same
distinction may exist under the United States Constitution.
165. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
166. Blaisdell involved a mortgage on real property, which is a contract that creates an
interest in the land mortgaged.
167. Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (The case involved statutes relating to
"lapsed" mineral rights where landowners gave leases of mineral rights to oil companies
subsequent to the effective date of the statute. The Court rejected both the taking and
impairment claims.).
168. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (The case involved
the validity of security interests in consumer personal and household goods under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Court held that the Act applied prospectively only, because
an interpretation permitting retroactive application of the statute would raise serious taking
issues.).
[Vol. 39:183
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
available. 169 From the viewpoint of positive law, such contract
rights are, however, easily distinguishable from mere promises to
perform an act or pay money. For example, in Energy Reserves,
Utility's refusal to pay ERG the deregulated price for gas, even if
it had actually promised to do so, would not give ERG the legal
right to any property of Utility. Rather, ERG's contract right was
simply to recover damages from Utility if it did not pay in full for
the gas. Most contract rights, then, differ from property rights be-
cause they do not represent a claim to dominion over specific re-
sources. 170 They are legal property, not "layman's" property, and
as one author demonstrates, they are less likely to be perceived as
"takable."'' The Supreme Court implicitly drew this distinction in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., which held
that a permanent occupation or destruction of real estate estab-
lishes a taking without the need for the more sophisticated balanc-
ing of economic interests involved in analyzing a claimed taking of
only a partial interest in tangible property.
The distinction between the two extremes of the contract right
spectrum may help illuminate more difficult cases, such as United
States Trust and Spannaus. The "right" involved in United
States Trust was the obligation of the Port Authority not to use its
revenues for commuter trains. This "negative pledge" gave the
bondholders no legal rights to the revenues themselves, but it gave
them greater comfort that the Authority would have sufficient as-
sets to pay the bonds when due. In other words, the covenant gave
them no right other than that they were the beneficiaries of the
Authority's obligation not to use the revenues for other purposes.
Certainly the repeal of the statutory covenant did not affect in any
way the absolute obligation of the Authority to pay the bonds.
What the legislative repeal affected was the creditors' important
security provision. 1 7 The repeal can therefore be viewed in two
different ways. First, one could argue that it totally destroyed the
negative pledge. Under the permanent occupation or total destruc-
169. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810)
(land grant).
170. Professor Rogers has argued convincingly that there is no constitutional difference
between secured and unsecured claims. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors'
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and
the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 988-95 (1983).
171. See ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 118-21 (1977).
172. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
173. Justice Brennan refused to concede that even this "practical" effect had occurred.
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 43 (1977).
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tion theory of Teleprompter, it would follow that the bondholders'
property was taken and that the obligation of the contract not to
use revenues was reduced or impaired. This same result, however,
would not follow as readily if the second view were taken-that the
repeal had no direct effect on the ultimate legal obligation to pay
the bonds. The bondholders' right under the bond contract to re-
ceive payment and their "legal" right to recover for damages if
payment was not made remained unaffected.
Much of the testimony at trial in United States Trust con-
cerned the actual and potential impact of the repeal on the value
of the bonds and the likelihood of payment.' 7 ' If, as the state ar-
gued, the bondholders had more than adequate assurance of repay-
ment even after repeal, 75 then there was no taking or impairment
of a "property" or "contract" right because there was no property
interest. This is so because a necessary element of the concept of
property, at least in the absence of a government edict, is value.
The right to use a limited or scarce resource, or to exclude others
from using it, must have an economic value. If everyone could use
the resource without interfering with the use of others, no one
could command payment from another for the right to use it. In
other words, only when a resource is scarce, in the sense that not
everyone can use it, is there any reason for the law to become in-
volved in determining whose "rights" are paramount. Conversely,
if a resource such as money, for example, is scarce, any right relat-
ing to that resource that is not valuable must not be a property
right-it must not be a "right" that is recognized and enforceable
174. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 176-82, 338 A.2d 833, 863-66
(1975).
175. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 8-10, United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J.
Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975). The state argued that the fact that the bonds kept their
"A" rating, even after repeal, evidenced a lack of injury to the bondholders and that the
only reason for the covenant was that the Authority itself did not want to be involved in the
rail business. In short, the investors had not bargained for the covenant that was designed
to protect the issuer, not the bondholders. Finally, the state argued that it could not reason-
ably be believed that the state would harm the bondholders because the state continuously
needed to raise capital in the bond market; and it, therefore, could not afford to kill the
golden egg-laying goose.
The U.S. Trust Company argued that the repeal injured the bondholders because the
price of the bonds affected fell from six to twelve points when the repeal was announced.
Furthermore, the fact that the Authority was "forced" to give New Jersey and New York
$120 million each for mass transit purposes, after the New Jersey court's decision in favor of
the Authority, demonstrated the repeal's effect on the Authority's revenues. Jurisdictional
statement at 14. The appellants relied on Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), to support
their contention that the Supreme Court of the United States could make its own determi-
nation of the facts from the record.
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in court.'7 6
If New Jersey in United States Trust was correct that the re-
peal of the covenant had absolutely no measurable effect on the
possibility of repayment, the bondholders would have had no legal
or equitable remedy for breach by the Authority. The bondholders
could not have shown any out-of-pocket loss to recover damages,
and an injunction would not have been available because the possi-
bility of any irreparable injury was remote. In short, the "contract
right" was not "property" because the availability of legal enforce-
ment, which is what makes a mere contract right a property inter-
est, was missing. 177
This analysis demonstrates the importance under current law
of identifying the obligation or right that is impaired or taken. Al-
though focusing on the narrowest contractual provision is likely to
produce impairment, focusing on the basic bargain is not. There
does not seem to be a clearly correct rationale for choosing one
characterization over another. But, as discussed in detail below,17 1
the right ultimately identified should not affect the value question;
thus the issue of whether a statute destroys or merely regulates a
contractual right should not be significant.
B. Contract Rights and Contract Obligations
In contrast, precise definition of the nature of the contract
right involved is perhaps the most significant factor involved in de-
termining whether the right is constitutionally protected from reg-
ulation that does not affect even a total destruction of the right.17 9
176. "But not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advan-
tages are 'rights' which have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized
may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their
invasion." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
177. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), established the
outer perimeters of the contract clause in this regard. There, a bondholder objected to a
reorganization of a city's debts on the grounds that it changed the payment terms of its
bonds. The Court rejected the claim on the ground that the bonds were worthless unless a
reorganization took place; events had made the claimant's rights theoretical and the Consti-
tution protects rights, not theories.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 212-17.
179. Teleprompter and United States Trust hold that the Constitution will not counte-
nance a total destruction of property by a statute. Exxon could be viewed as a contrary
holding, but the Court's rationale was that Exxon never had a right to pass through in-
creased costs because its ability to do so was always subject to the police power. Cf. New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 491-95 (1970) (investors in railroad assumed the risk
of reorganization losses when they invested in a public utility). These decisions are thus
consistent with the ensuing discussion of the importance of identifying reliance interests in
the constitutional context.
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Spannaus illustrates the distinction between identifying the right
and determining its nature. In Spannaus, the Minnesota pension
statute imposed an additional obligation on the employer, Allied
Structural Steel Company. Justice Stewart viewed the statute as
impairing Allied's unfettered discretion to terminate its pension
plan for Minnesota employees or to simply terminate the employ-
ment relationship with those employees. Certainly, if the agree-
ment establishing the plan had included a provision permitting Al-
lied to terminate at any time, Allied would in fact have had a
contractual right to terminate.
But even if Allied had the right to terminate the contract, it
does not necessarily follow that legislation affecting that right "im-
paired the obligation of the contract" so as to invalidate it under
the language of the contract clause.18 0 The problem lies in estab-
lishing what type of property right the phrase "obligation of con-
tract"181 protects. In Spannaus, Justice Brennan argued in dissent
that a statute that merely imposed a new obligation on a con-
tracting party could not violate the contract clause.18 2 The major-
180. See Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1980). In Garris, the
Fourth Circuit held invalid a statute prohibiting insurers from terminating agents because
of the amount of assigned risk insurance they generated. The court found a substantial
impairment of the insurer's contractual right to terminate without cause because the statute
in effect subjected every termination "to costly and disruptive legal challenges" requiring
the insurer to demonstrate that termination had not resulted from assigned risk policies
that an agent generated. The court's emphasis on freedom from litigation as a property
right of sorts is not appealing. In a sense, an inherent attribute of the ownership of property
is the need to protect it against infringement; the ultimate evidence of the "ownership" of a
contract right is the ability to fend off a lawsuit challenging that right. To say that govern-
ment action that encourages "unmeritorious" litigation impairs the right is thus putting the
cart before the horse. Cf. Agins v. Triburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) (institution of
condemnation proceedings may affect the value of property, but that is merely an incident
of ownership).
181. State contract law precludes enforcement of many contract "rights," including
those in gambling contracts and those involving penalties and forfeitures. A contract right is
a property right only if it is enforceable as a matter of nondiscriminatory state law or if it is
rooted in some noncontract property right of the other party, as is the case with a pledge.
Most state law restrictions on the enforcement of contractual rights do not raise con-
tract clause issues because the clause applies only to legislation not to judicial acts. McCoy
v. Union Elevated R.R., 247 U.S. 354, 363 (1918). One rationale is that judges merely apply
the law as others have always applied it. Another is that judges are less subject to
majoritarian pressures so that it is unlikely the clause was intended to apply to common law
decisions. Obviously, neither rationale is wholly convincing. To the extent the first rationale
is accepted, however, the same rule logically should apply where the legislature is simply
defining common law concepts. For example, a court could construe the Minnesota statute
involved in Spannaus as an attempt to define the obligation of good faith in the pension
context. See supra note 93. The fact that a legislature rather than a court refuses to permit
termination does not require a conclusion that there has been an impairment.
182. 438 U.S. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ity rejected that interpretation on the basis of precedent and on
the rationale that imposing an obligation necessarily takes away a
right or reduces the obligation of the other party.183 Brennan's ar-
gument is undoubtedly overstated,184 but the majority's response is
not entirely convincing. First, the precedent that the majority re-
lied on either does not support the majority's position or does not
directly address Brennan's argument.18 Second, the majority's
right/obligation argument is not necessarily valid. The Minnesota
statute did not reduce the obligation of the Allied employees under
the plan. They still had to satisfy all service and vesting require-
ments of the plan. The statute simply affected the timing of pen-
sion funding. It created a new obligation, it did not destroy or re-
duce one. Third, the statute does not fall within the contract
clause's presumed historical purpose of prohibiting states from
adopting debtor-relief laws." *
Spannaus is a hard case conceptually because the state pen-
sion statute affected the performance of the person that the stat-
ute burdened rather than the performance of the beneficiary. Al-
lied's position was essentially no different from that of the bakers
in Lochner v. New York 187 where the Court upheld a New York
statute that limited working hours in bakeries. Status or past con-
duct, just like other regulatory statutes, determines the incidence
of the pension statute. Yet, just because that status is contract-
related does not bring it within the contract clause. Allied's right
to terminate the plan still existed, it simply cost more to
183. Id. at 244 n.16.
184. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 112-17.
185. Brennan relied on Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829), which
upheld a statute validating previously unrecognized landlord-tenant relationships on the
ground that to create a contract could not possibly also impair that contract.
The majority cited two cases that are at least superficially contrary to Brennan's read-
ing of Satterlee. Brennan argued that Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916),
and Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923), which involved disputes over
the effects of annexation on transit contracts, were simply wrong. It is perhaps typical of the
contract clause doctrine that the court could have decided both cases the same way on non-
constitutional grounds because the contracts were subject to interpretation on the issue.
More fundamentally, in each case the challenged statute did not simply impose an addi-
tional obligation; the claimants had been serving the territory before annexation and charg-
ing higher fares. In effect, the statute reduced the fare that each claimant earned for per-
forming services it had been performing before. Thus, there was clearly a reduction in
rights, but it does not necessarily follow that the addition of an obligation diminishes a right
in all cases.
186. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
187. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court held that a New York statute that lim-
ited employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day violated the contract
clause and could not be justified as a valid exercise of police power.
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exercise. 188
Spannaus demonstrates the futility of attempts to determine
the proper role of the contract clause as a limitation on economic
regulation by reference to formalistic distinctions like the right/ob-
ligation dichotomy."' A consideration of the original purposes of
the clause offers a more promising means of determining the core
policy of the clause. As indicated earlier, there are two general con-
ceptions of the policy basis of the contract clause:190 (1) Justice
Brennan's view that the clause should be limited to class legisla-
tion such as debtor-relief measures;1 9' and (2) Justice Black's view
that the clause is intended to protect those who have relied on past
laws in structuring their affairs.9 2
The first view is consistent with the Framers' interest in en-
suring the growth of commerce among the states. Bargaining,
rather than ownership, is the basis of commerce because commerce
performs the essential function of allocating resources. Therefore,
there may be good reason to single out contract rights instead of
other property rights for special constitutional treatment. Trade
and especially credit among the states would be greatly hampered
if states could pass laws relieving their citizens of obligations. This
would be an especially serious problem in those situations in which
the creditor had already lent money or the seller had delivered
goods. To avoid the risks of such legislation, lenders might refuse
to deal except at higher interest rates or on a secured basis, and
sellers might refuse to sell unless payment was made in advance or
on delivery. Commerce would hardly flourish in such an atmo-
sphere. 9 3 Thus, it seems clear that the contract clause, like the
commerce clause, has a major macroeconomic thrust. Brennan's
188. See infra note 328 and accompanying text. This is the essential import of the fa-
mous Holmes's aphorism.
189. The Court recognized in Blaisdell the inadequacy of the somewhat analogous
right/remedy distinction that had been in vogue since the Marshall Court. See supra note
55 and accompanying text. The Court had never completely accepted the distinction. See
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 287-89 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring).
190. The lack of legislative history for the clause prevents any pretense that the follow-
ing analysis is historically accurate. Rather, it is simply an effort to consider the implica-
tions of the two generally accepted purposes of the clause.
191. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
193. The lender-seller's risk in this situation is entirely different from the usual credit
risk related to the borrower-buyer's prospective inability or refusal to pay. Use of documen-
tary drafts, letters of credit, and other devices can reduce those traditional risks. In con-
trast, even a letter of credit in favor of the seller would not eliminate the risk of impairing
legislation.
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view alone, however, does not explain the role of the clause.
Debtor-relief legislation would have an adverse effect on commerce
whether the legislation were in effect prospectively only or both
retroactively and prospectively. Even prospective legislation would
hinder commerce because creditor-sellers would be required to
continually monitor other states' laws.""
Justice Black's view thus adds a crucial element. His view fo-
cuses less on macroeconomics than on the basic unfairness of up-
setting an individual's affairs by changing rules on which the indi-
vidual has relied. Hindrances to commerce from prospective
changes may be necessary, but it is unfair to change the rules after
a debtor has cashed a loan check or a buyer has received goods. In
other words, only reliance makes a statute truly retroactive. If a
seller finds out about a change in the buyer's rights before ship-
ment, the seller can refuse to ship. Whether that refusal is "right-
ful" is irrelevant because the seller could have negotiated for the
right to shift the risk.1 "5 Such a right is of no importance, however,
once the goods are delivered because the seller is then at the
buyer's mercy. After delivery, the seller's only protection is the
contract clause.
Spannaus offers a good example of this point. The only reli-
ance in that case could have been by the employees, who may have
remained in Allied's employ or foregone other savings because of
their reliance on the promise of a pension. Justice Stewart, how-
ever, claimed that Allied had "relied" on the lack of regulation."
Yet, reliance on lack of regulation should not be relevant for three
reasons. First, it is difficult to determine reliance other than on the
basis of self-serving testimony. Second, an absence of regulation
today is perhaps the surest indication that government action is
just around the corner. This principle is especially apparent in
Spannaus because abuses in pensions have been widely publicized
for years.1 97 Indeed, the argument of a party contracting in a heav-
194. This was no easy task in the days of poor communication, and it is no easier today
in the days of high legal fees. Cf. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245-
46 (1978).
195. An "Act of God" is a common contract provision that drafters of contracts use to
protect parties when one party to the contract cannot perform a contractual duty due to
factors outside the parties' control. See, e.g., Uissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc.,
729 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1984). By using such a provision, the parties may expressly allocate
the risk of loss in the event of stipulated occurrences.
196. The record was clear "that Allied's actuarial assumptions in calculating its annual
contributions to the pension plan did not include the possibility of a plant's closing." Id. at
253 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. See, e.g., Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems
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ily regulated industry that it relied on a saturation of regulation is
equally implausible. 198 Third, Allied's claim was not that it had
taken action in reliance on the efficacy of the employees' obliga-
tions but that it had relied on its contractual right to terminate the
plan, avoid liability, and retain its funds. Such reliance, however, is
no different from the reliance of any property owner ordering his
affairs on the basis of the resources over which he has command.
The function of the contract clause should be to protect a party's
reliance on performance of the contract and not merely on owner-
ship of a contract right. The contract clause protects reliance on
the right itself only when that right is in fact the "flip side" of the
obligation that the legislation eliminated.
Four hypotheticals based on Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York' 99 illustrate this crucial distinction. In Penn Central,
the Supreme Court rejected Penn Central's claim that New York's
classification of Grand Central Terminal as a historical landmark
constituted a taking because it prevented Penn Central from de-
veloping the property to its fullest potential. In the first hypotheti-
cal, assume that Penn Central purchased the terminal in 1935. In
1975 it decides to "develop" the property by building a fifty-story
office building on top of it. In 1976, before construction has
started, New York passes an ordinance prohibiting development.
In 1976, Penn Central clearly had a "right" to develop, and this
right could be termed a property right because Penn Central had
an entitlement to so use the resources involved. But Penn Central
did not rely on that right before New York passed the ordinance
unless it had backed that expectation with an irreversible invest-
ment of resources.200 It only had an "expectation" that it could de-
velop the terminal.2 0' The policy of the contract clause as outlined
and Some Proposals, 76 HARV. L. REV. 952 (1963).
198. The regulation issue is also subject to the vagaries of labeling. Cf. Garris v. Hano-
ver Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1980) (regulation of insurance for public protection
versus regulation of relations between insurer and agents).
199. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
200. Thus, it is not enough that a party has bargained for a right. See supra note 116.
"Bargaining" is necessary for reliance but not sufficient to prove reliance.
201. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). Justice Rehnquist
found that the United States had taken Kaiser Aetna's property when it held that a passage
from the ocean to Kuapa Pond was open to the public. With the consent of the government,
and in connection with its development of a private marina, Kaiser had dredged the pas-
sage. Rehnquist used the opportunity to expound on the investment-backed expectation fac-
tor on which he had focused in Penn Central. Recognizing that Kaiser could not estop the
Government from taking action, Rehnquist nevertheless recognized the fact that the Gov-
ernment authorized the dredging can "lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies em-
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above suggests that only a reliance interest or "investment-backed
expectation" is entitled to constitutional protection. 02
This situation should be contrasted with a second hypothetical
in which Penn Central contracts to purchase the terminal just
prior to passage of the ordinance. Here there could be reliance on
the development "right" if the price paid reflected the develop-
ment potential. It does not necessarily follow, however, that every
reliance interest should be constitutionally protected. One who
purchases property for development assumes many risks, including
cost overruns, a slowdown or decrease in demand for space, and
construction of competing space. In a sense, government regulation
is just another risk of ownership and such a risk may, as may the
right to future development, be built into the purchase price.
The contract and taking clauses reduce the risk of retroactive
government action, but there is little reason to protect the investor
who should have anticipated government regulation. Therefore,
even if Penn Central purchased the terminal with the expectation
to develop it, its investment should be constitutionally protected
only if (a) it has paid a premium for development and (b) regula-
tion was not reasonably foreseeable. Only when such "reliance" can
be shown would the hardship that specific legislation causes be suf-
ficient to bring the taking or the contract clause into effect.2 " Oth-
bodied in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Govern-
ment must condemn and pay for before it takes over the management of the landowner's
property." Id. at 179.
Although Kaiser was a case of actual physical invasion rather than mere regulation, the
analysis of protected interests should be the same; any difference in analysis would relate to
the degree of interference that is permitted with respect to those expectancies. For present
purposes, it must be stressed that Justice Rehnquist has not delineated the boundaries of an
investment-backed expectation factor. Kaiser was an easy case where the investment and
reliance were obvious. The hypotheticals discussed in this Article are intended to investigate
what precisely "investment" means and what is necessary to make such expectations "legiti-
mate." Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (requiring shopping
center owners to allow nonowners to exercise their freedom of expression through petitions
is not a "taking" under the fifth amendment).
202. The Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972), recognized the
importance of reliance: "It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect
those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined." Id. Professor Michelman places much less emphasis on the importance of
reliance in determining the scope of property rights that the Constitution protects. See
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1981).
Michelman's focus, however, is on expanding the concept of property to protect political
and personal rights. Cf. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (breach of a prior government commitment concerning railroad
workers' retirement benefits frustrated their legitimate expectations).
203. The second hypothetical presents no contract clause issue because the seller has
completely executed the contract involving the purchase of the property. As the purchase
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erwise, there is insufficient reason to believe that the risk of gov-
ernment action differs from other risks.
In the third hypothetical, assume Penn Central bought the
terminal before the passage of the 1976 ordinance, under an in-
stallment land sale contract that gave Penn Central the "right" to
develop the property and place liens on it superior to the seller's
interest. This case is similar to Spannaus-there is a contract, and
legislation colorably affects a contract right. It should not matter
whether the ordinance prohibits development or simply makes it
more expensive. Either way, it interferes with Penn Central's con-
tract right. Penn Central, however, does not have a contract clause
claim because the statute does not affect the seller's obligation at
all. On the other hand, if Penn Central had already begun develop-
ment or if Penn Central had agreed to pay the seller a premium for
the development option at a time when government was not rea-
sonably foreseeable.
The fourth hypothetical presents another "false" contract
clause problem. Assume Penn Central purchased the terminal on
the basis of an agreement that it would develop the terminal and
pay the seller a percentage of the rents received from the fifty-
story building. Later, the state legislature passes an ordinance
prohibiting development, and the seller seeks a declaration that
the ordinance is invalid because it impairs Penn Central's rental
obligation. The seller should lose. Although there is no doubt that
the ordinance "impaired" the seller's right, the contract clause did
not protect the seller's right. The ordinance did not, by its terms
or effect, reduce the obligation of Penn Central to pay rent for the
existing structure. The ordinance merely eliminated the seller's
(and Penn Central's) expectation that, if the development oc-
curred, a higher rent would be paid. Such legislation did not affect
any reliance interest of the seller; presumably he will receive the
same value for the "undeveloped" property from Penn Central as
he would have received from any other party. But even if he does
not, that is a risk against which he could have protected himself at
the time he negotiated the sale contract with Penn Central.
It is only when a party cannot protect himself by contract
from the adverse government action that a constitutionally pro-
tected contract right may be affected. In the fourth hypothetical,
the seller was in the same position after passage of the ordinance
price did not include a premium to insure the possibility of future development, Penn Cen-
tral got all it bargained for from the seller.
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as he would have been if he had not sold the property. His return
on his investment in the property has been reduced only because
development is no longer possible, not because the ordinance re-
lieved Penn Central of the obligation to pay for development-gen-
erated benefits. Compare this case to the classic debtor-relief mea-
sure; the creditor's old property (the money lent) is as valuable or
even more valuable after the passage of the ordinance as it was
before, but the value of the debtor's promise has been reduced. In
the fourth hypothetical, what Penn Central received is reduced in
value; thus there is no unjust or unfair enrichment of the other
party to the contract.
In summary, the contract clause does not and should not pro-
tect all contract rights from impairment. Courts should narrowly
interpret the clause because it interferes with legislative efforts to
meet the needs of a changing society. The Court's failure to iden-
tify the precise nature of the property interest that the clause pro-
tects has led to decisions that interpret the clause more broadly
than its policy underpinnings justify. Perhaps more importantly,
this has led to confusing opinions and undue reliance on the police
power doctrine.0 4 Fortunately, there is still ample opportunity for
the Court to incorporate a reliance analysis into its restructuring of
the contract clause.
V. RECONCILING THE CONTRACT CLAUSE WITH THE TAKING CLAUSE
Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Brennan recognized in
United States Trust that New Jersey could have accomplished its
objective by "condemning" the bondholder's interest in the 1962
covenant and agreed that condemnation would have eliminated the
bondholders' contract clause claim.20 5 Application of the taking
clause would be preferable in most cases to reliance on the contract
clause because the former both permits the state to accomplish its
public purpose and protects the contractual rights of the contrac-
204. A good example is Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400 (1983).
205. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 19 n.16, 42 n.11. Query to what extent inverse
condemnation would be available in United States Trust after Pruneyard. Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) ("literal taking" of right to exclude persons from
shopping center not a "constitutional taking"). See supra notes 164 & 201. To a great ex-
tent, the Court's recent problems in deciding "regulatory taking" cases presents substantial
problems beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Symposium: Constitutional Issue
in Land Use Regulation, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449 (1981) (exploring such questions as the
proper remedy for inverse condemnation actions).
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tor.0 6 In those situations in which a statute both "takes" and "im-
pairs," use of the taking clause would seem to be a less desirable
alternative than the contract clause only where the nature or value
of the contract right "taken" would be speculative.2 7 The situation
can be compared to that of the availability of specific performance
for breach of contract. The aggrieved party may desire to obtain
specific performance rather than damages, but she can only do so
if damages would be speculative or inadequate. 08
The same rule should apply in contract clause cases. That is,
where a state or a local government interferes with contractual
rights, the contractor should be limited to an inverse condemna-
tion action unless a taking has not occurred or just compensation
cannot be measured. The justification for this proposal is not
merely a desire for symmetry between contract law and constitu-
tional law. The justification is that the same policies support the
206. A compensation award protects the contractor's rights because a contract does not
give a party a legal right to performance but only a right to damages if the other party does
not perform a contractual duty. See Hale, supra note 5, at 518. For the view that use of
eminent domain is particularly appropriate in the context of public contracts, see Sax, Tak-
ings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). Professor Sax has somewhat modified the
views expressed in his 1964 article with respect to the manner in which property rights are
defined and analyzed. In a 1971 article, he focused on whether there is a conflict in "rights"
between property owners in the sense that a use by one interferes with a use of property by
another. Only when these "spillover" effects are present can the government regulate with-
out triggering.the taking clause. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971).
207. The taking clause may not apply to all "impairments" because of the Supreme
Court's ad hoc decision-making as to what constitutes a "taking." See supra note 205; see
also Freilich, Solving the Taking Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of the Parts,
15 URa. LAw. 447 (1983) (explores the constitutional analysis and doctrinal suport for the
basic rule of Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981)); Mandelker, Land Use Takings: the Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981) (examines the compensation issue in land use regulation and deter-
mines that there has never been an absolute right to compensation, even where an interfer-
ence with property rights is sufficient to constitute a taking); cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). This problem, however, could be eliminated if the approach
urged in 1964 by Sax were combined with the approach urged here. See supra note 206. In
essence, Sax argued that a taking should be found whenever a government is acting as an
"enterprise" or a "mediator." Although Sax has modified his views, he still recognizes an
"equal protection" aspect to compensation law that prohibits an arbitrary or discriminating
decision as to who is to bear the risk of loss in the event of government action. See supra
note 206. Moreover, he is particularly aware of the problems involved when the government
acts in its own self interest. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 60, 63
(1964). Sax notes that "the protection afforded [by the taking clause] is most properly
viewed as a guarantee against unfair or arbitrary government," and that "when economic
loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its own resource position ...
then compensation is constitutionally required." Id. at 60, 63.
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1979).
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same rule in both areas. A court will not enforce a statute that is
found to violate the contract clause. Imposition of the clause pre-
serves the status quo and prevents the government from dealing
with what presumably is a legitimate concern. Such a significant
interference with the legislative process should occur only when
necessary. Allowing a contract clause claim where an inverse con-
demnation action is available wastes resources and is unnecessary
to protect the rights of the claimant. It wastes public resources be-
cause, as Justices Black and Brennan have recognized, enjoining
enforcement under the contract clause does not prevent the gov-
ernment from later condemning the affected right. If the govern-
ment really cares about the issue, the only result of a successful
contract clause action is a later eminent domain proceeding. Such
a proceeding is a waste of judicial, legislative, executive, and pri-
vate resources.
Allowing the contract clause claim where a taking claim is
available is unnecessary because the essence of the property inter-
est that a contract right represents, as a matter of contract law, is
simply the right to be placed in the economic position that would
have resulted from performance."0 9 State contract law is directly
relevant here; there is no basis in the history of the clause for a
conclusion that the clause protects anything other than derivative
rights2 10 Indeed, contract clause protection is narrower in scope
than the protection that state contract law affords to contract
rights because the former should protect only reliance interests,
whereas state contract law generally protects both reliance and ex-
pectation interests. There can be no justification for giving a claim-
ant greater rights under the Constitution than he enjoys under the
law creating his property interest. Yet, that would be the case if a
claimant could obtain constitutional specific performance even
where inverse condemnation damages are adequate.
The inverse condemnation action should be required only
where an award of damages would in fact be just compensation for
interference with or deprivation of the contract right.2  In the vast
209. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373
(1936-1937).
210. Nor does there seem to be a strong justification for extending the clause beyond its
historical purposes. The clause does not rank with due process or equal protection as a
fundamental concept of ordered liberty. Thus, the Michelman argument for expansion of
the property concept to protect political and personal rights is not persuasive here. See
Michelman, supra note 202.
211. Of course, the claimant could combine his contract clause and inverse condemna-
tion actions in one suit.
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majority of contract right cases, as in tangible property cases, it is
possible to measure monetarily the value of the right taken. The
fact that it is difficult to determine the amount of the award
should not mean that a court cannot determine just compensation
in all cases.
United States Trust illustrates the problems that a judicial
calculation of an award presents. Justice Blackmun did not find it
necessary to consider the value of the right taken or impaired.21 2
On the other hand, Justice Brennan believed that the covenant
was of little or no value to the bondholders." Brennan's view was
based on the findings of the trial court that the obligation of the
Port Authority to the bondholders to pay principal and interest
had not been affected nor had the repeal of the covenant substan-
tially reduced the value of the revenues pledged to the bondhold-
ers.214 Justice Brennan's analysis, however, is unacceptable. Virtu-
ally any covenant, other than a promise to pay or the giving of
collateral per se would be subject to the same attack. In the typical
financing situation, such as that before the Court in United States
Trust, it is extremely difficult to attribute to the various restrictive
covenants separate monetary values as of the date of the taking.
However, those experienced in pricing or evaluating financial in-
struments, such as investment bankers, rating services and institu-
tional investors, should be able to estimate the difference in the
interest rate that puts the lender in the same position as if the
restrictive covenant had not been included. Unless some event has
occurred during the period between the original loan and the tak-
ing, one could reasonably presume that the differential has re-
mained constant. Of course, if the right taken was simply "belt and
suspenders" protection that gave no real benefit to the lender,
Brennan's viewpoint would be correct. Despite the trial court's
findings in United States Trust, the covenant did appear to have a
tangible value.21
Of course, the just compensation awarded in an inverse con-
demnation action need not be monetary. There appears to be no
reason why a court could not compensate a party whose contract
right had been taken by substituting a right of equivalent value.2 1 6
212. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 19.
213. Id. at 42 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 41-43.
215. Id. at 18-19.
216. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978), involved the issu-
ance of transfer development rights (TDRs) to owners whose development rights had been
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In United States Trust, instead of awarding the bondholders dam-
ages for the taking, with a commensurate credit to the Authority
on the amount due on the bonds, the Court could have given the
bondholders a similar negative pledge on other funds, a mortgage
on other property, or even a right to demand payment on an accel-
erated basis if the commuter project did in fact drain the Author-
ity's funds. Thus, even though the evaluation problems involved in
nonmonetary compensation are difficult, a substitution of rights
would not place an undue strain on the public entity's resources. 17
Justice Blackmun's response to this suggestion would appar-
ently have been that the legislature has the burden of making
these determinations, and it cannot shift that burden to the other
contracting party or to the courts. The courts should, however, de-
cide the taking and compensation issues first. Although in some
cases the State legislatures may have adopted the legislation sim-
ply to avoid paying for the contract right, in most cases, it is more
likely that the legislature reasonably determined that the legisla-
tion was constitutional as applied to the specific right at issue or it
may not have been aware of the legislation's effect on the right. It
insults the notion of judicial economy for a court to merely declare
the legislation unconstitutional under the contract clause without
making a threshold determination as to just compensation for an
inverse condemnation, because the case will be right back in the
courts the next time the legislature tries to circumvent paying for a
contract right through legislation. Second, the challenged legisla-
tion may be the result of compromises between the government
and the claimant. In other words, it may in fact be the claimant
who is seeking to shift the burden of determining compensation to
the courts.
If a court reaches the contract clause claim only when an in-
verse condemnation award would not restore the claimant to the
status quo, contract clause claims should be limited to two types of
"taken." The Court considered the TDRs to be relevant to the taking question. Even if
TDRs do not constitute just compensation for a taking, a court must take them into account
in considering the impact of a statute on the owner. TDRs may mitigate a statute's infringe-
ment on an owner's property right. Inherent in such an analysis is the assumption that a
regulatory taking is fundamentally different from a Teleprompter taking (permanent occu-
pation or destruction of real estate). See supra text accompanying note 172. For a regula-
tory taking, the fifth amendment requires not "just" compensation, but minimal, nonconfis-
catory compensation. The better view would be to analyze TDRs as relevant only to the
compensation issue because it is the degree and type of effect on the interest in the property
that the regulation affects that is the heart of the taking or impairment question.
217. Congress has implemented a comparable approach in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-363, 1129.
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cases. The first is the presumably narrow class of cases where just
compensation cannot be determined. As discussed above, there
should be few claims in this group because courts should be able to
adjust the remaining contractual relationships whether the con-
tract is public or private. The second group, a potentially larger
class, consists of those cases in which there has not been a tak-
ing.215 Most statutes that "impair" will also "take" because of the
similarity of the interests that the two clauses protect. Thus, a
statute that reduces the efficiency of the other party's performance
will probably constitute both an impairment and a taking. A stat-
ute that only imposes an additional obligation on a party, however,
probably will not constitute a taking, but it may constitute an im-
pairment, especially in the public contract context. In short, the
requirement that an inverse condemnation claim be determined
before a contract clause claim does not write the contract clause
out of the Constitution. The requirement would simply reduce un-
necessary judicial interference with legislative goals and would
eliminate the potential for wasteful and circuitous impairment ver-
sus condemnation litigation scenarios.119
One obvious obstacle to effective use of the taking clause as a
prerequisite to use of the contract clause is the Supreme Court's
recent confusion in determining whether a "taking" has oc-
curred.220 By deciding inverse condemnation cases on an ad hoc
218. A discussion of the law of "taking" without due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment is beyond the scope of this Article.
219. Such a rule would be consistent with Hays v. Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920). Hays
had a contract with the state to excavate a waterway. After a dispute arose between the
parties, the state transferred the land to the Port of Seattle. The act transferring title did
not by its terms affect Hays's right to payment under the contract or his lien on the land.
The Court held that legislation that merely breaches an agreement with a public entity does
not give rise to a claim under the contract clause. Instead, the contractor is limited to an
action for breach of the contract.
The Hays rule frequently will provide the same result in public contract cases as would
the taking clause. In other cases, however, resort to the taking clause will be necessary. For
example, legislation that prevents an action on a public contract or that imposes additional
obligations on the contractor generally will not be comparable to a breach of the contract by
the government unless a court could construe the legislation as a repudiation.
220. See supra note 205. Another problem that may arise in the context of public pro-
ject agreements is that the government party to the contract may not have eminent domain
power. In such a case, the courts have held that the contractor cannot bring an inverse
condemnation action. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353,
1358 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Va-
lidity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. Rsv. 1439, 1450-51 (1974).
Professor Cunningham believes that a § 1983 damage action should be available:
It is now settled that municipalities and other local government units are "per-
sons" and may therefore be liable under section 1983, that the good faith of local
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basis, the Court has given little guidance to lower courts. There is
reason to believe, however, that the "taking" problem will be less
substantial in contract clause cases because the bundle of rights
present in contract claims are more defined than the bundle of
rights present in typical land use cases. Courts have a great deal
more experience in interpreting contracts and determining the par-
ties' relative rights than they have in identifying the nature and
extent of rights in real property. 2 1 The "legal" nature of contract
rights and their inseparability from the question of remedy makes
them more appropriate for judicial definition. Moreover, contract
rights must be reasonably definite to be enforceable under state
law. The courts, therefore, should not be faced with the quasi-
philisophical problems that have perplexed those dealing with al-
leged takings of "stick" interests from a tangible property bundle.
Another obstacle to adoption of this proposal is the argument
that damages are not an appropriate remedy for a regulatory tak-
ing. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego,2  the Supreme
Court refused to reach this issue because it determined that the
state court judgment was not "final." Justice Brennan in dissent,
however, reached the merits and found that the states are constitu-
tionally required to award damages for an uncompensated regula-
tory taking.2 23 Because three other Justices joined the dissent and
Justice Rehnquist indicated 224 that he agreed with Justice Brennan
government officials whose actions deprive a "person" of federal constitutional
or statutory rights does not immunize the local government from such liability,
and that there is a cause of action under section 1983 when one is deprived of
property without due process of law.
Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 517, 541 (1981) (footnotes omitted); see also Mandelker, supra note 207 (If a
party is unable to bring an action for damages, he may nonetheless attack the legislation
under the contract clause.).
Another problem with using the taking clause is judicial assessment of the value of the
property taken. If a monetary award is not appropriate, a court should be able to fashion a
substitute right. See Kraft, Loikith & Petkanics, Accommodating the Rights of Bondholders
and State Public Purposes: Beyond United States Trust, 55 TuL. L. REV. 735, 769-70
(1981).
221. Professor Michelman has concluded that courts do a satisfactory job of balancing
the competing interests in taking cases. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundation of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1169
(1967).
222. 450 U.S. 621, 630 (1981).
223. Id. at 653-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under Brennan's view, a court need not
award damages in the full amount of the property's value. The government has the option of
rescinding the statute or regulation and paying damages only for loss of use during the
interim. Id. at 653.
224. Id. at 633-34, 636.
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on the merits, it appears that damages will be available.22 Some
commentators point out that Justice Brennan's conclusions lack a
constitutional basis. None of the United States Supreme Court
cases on which Justice Brennan relied held that the fourteenth
amendment requires that compensation be awarded to a land-
owner whenever the Court finds that a regulatory taking has
occurred.22
Even if the view that damages should not be awarded in land
use regulation cases does prevail, inverse condemnation should still
be available in disputes over public contract rights. A legislature or
a responsible administrative agency should be able to determine
the number of public contracts that legislation has affected and
the impact of legislation on the contractor's rights. These consider-
ations eliminate much of the force of the arguments supporting the
restriction of remedies in land use planning cases, which generally
involve larger numbers of landowners and ill-defined taking issues.,
VI. THE MEANING OF IMPAIRMENT
A. The Initial Inquiry: Has the Contract Been Modified?
The Supreme Court held in the early 19th century that any
law that modifies a contract constitutes an impairment of the con-
stitutional right to contract.22 1 The Court, however, has established
in Blaisdell, El Paso, and Exxon that not every modification of a
contractual obligation or right is an impairment. Unfortunately,
the Court has given very little guidance on how to analyze the is-
sue and determine whether a modification is an impairment.
The Court has established several rules of "construction" re-
garding modification. First, state law determines whether a modifi-
cation or impairment has occurred;228 however, federal courts are
to make their own determination of what obligations state law cre-
ates.22 9 Secondly, courts are to construe public contracts strictly in
225. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1198-99 (5th Cir. 1981). The Her-
nandez court based its decision on the reasoning Justice Brennan provided in his dissent in
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658-59 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
226. Cunningham, supra note 220, at 538.
227. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Hale, supra note 5, at 871.
228. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931); Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364, 380
(1926); Hale, supra note 5, at 852-60.
229. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 561 (1942); Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S.
364, 380 (1926); cf. Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 322 (1937) (weight will be given
to the construction of the statute by the courts of the state). Further, although the Supreme
Court may follow state law existing prior to the contract, it may not accept the state court's
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favor of the state and resolve every ambiguity against the contrac-
tor.230 After Energy Reserves and Exxon, one could argue that all
contracts are to be strictly construed against the claimant.2 31 Fi-
nally, in the public contract arena, a court must distinguish a mod-
ification or impairment from a breach. If legislative action breaches
a contract but does not modify the contractor's obligations or rem-
edies, a constitutional issue is not raised.2 32
The application of these rules frequently will dispose of a con-
tention that legislation has modified a contract, but most cases will
require that a court determine the precise nature of the parties'
bargain. The mere fact that legislation has affected a contractor's
method of performance does not mean that it has modified the
contract. For example, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Golds-
boro, s33 the railroad claimed that city ordinances regulating the
right to use its tracks violated its right of way. contract with the
state. No mention was made in the charter that the railroad was
exempt from city ordinances, so the rule of strict construction pro-
vided a ready answer to the railroad's claim.23 The railroad no
longer had unlimited use of the right of way that it had enjoyed in
the past, but the new restrictions did not limit any right that the
parties expressly bargained for in the railroad's charter. In a sense,
the ordinances did not modify the respective rights or obligations
bargained for and created by the contract but merely the conse-
quential benefits flowing from the rights granted therein.
Of course, legislation may constitute a modification even
though the right it affects is not explicit in the contract. For exam-
present understanding of previous decisions construing state law. For a detailed discussion
of the decisions on this issue, see Hale, supra note 5, at 852-71.
230. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); see
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 279-83.
231. See supro note 152.
232. See supra note 219. Although this rule appears settled, its application is unclear. A
good example of the uncertainty in this area is Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, 580
F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1070 (1979). There, the federal court found
that the statute in question merely breached the contract; and it dismissed the contractor's
constitutional claim, which required the contractor to bring its claim for breach of contract
in state court. Unfortunately, because of the eleventh amendment immunity, the contractor
could not bring a suit for breach of contract against the state in federal court at the same
time that he brought a contract claim. Id. at 309-10. In other words, rather than risking
statute of limitation problems, a plaintiff should bring both his breach of contract and con-
tract clause actions together in state court when it is unclear whether legislation merely
breaches a contract or impairs a contract's obligation.
233. 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
234. The Court, however, decided the case under the police power doctrine rather than
the rule of strict construction.
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ple, E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve District23 5 involved an
ordinance prohibiting the plaintiff from using liquid wastes to
complete the landfill project the plaintiff had contracted with the
defendant to construct. The Seventh Circuit recognized that the
trial court would be required to determine whether the parties con-
templated the use of liquid waste, even though it was not expressly
addressed in the contract.28 The Court, if confronted with the is-
sue, should adopt the same approach.
Issues of interpretation may be presented even if the legisla-
tion deals with a subject the contract explicitly covered. In Puerto
Rico v. Russell & Co.,237 an irrigation district had contracted with a
landowner whose property was located outside the district to de-
liver water free of charge in exchange for the landowner foregoing
his riparian rights. Under the contract, the landowner was also en-
titled to a portion of any surplus water supply. When the land-
owner objected to the district's failure to deliver the surplus, the
district enacted a statute that empowered it to impose a tax on
landowners who received water but whose lands were not in the
district. The Court viewed the tax as a charge for water that was
explicitly outside the scope of the contract and held that it vio-
lated a provision of the Puerto Rican constitution prohibiting the
impairment of contracts. " '
Unfortunately, in cases such as United States Trust and En-
ergy Reserves, the Court reached a decision with little attention to
the record or without adequate explanation. Project agreements
with public entities, which generally involve more negotiation and
documentation than government procurement contracts, offer a
good example of the difficulties the modification issue can present.
For example, a project agreement for a waste treatment plant may
require the builder to satisfy certain pollution control standards. If
the local government later adopts ordinances that change the pol-
lution standards, the issue would arise as to whether imposition of
the new standards modify the contract. Both sides would undoubt-
edly rely on the fact that the project agreement included a "merger
clause," which provides that the written agreement contains all un-
derstandings between the parties and that no additional obliga-
tions will be implied against either party with respect to the sub-
235. 613 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1980).
236. Id. at 678 n.4.
237. 315 U.S. 610 (1942).
238. Id. at 616-19.
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jects dealt with in the agreement.2 39 The government would argue
that the merger clause prohibits the contractor from claiming that
the government implicitly agreed not to impose additional or more
burdensome controls. The contractor would argue that the merger
clause prohibits the government from, in effect, implying a cove-
nant that it could change the standards the agreement imposes.
These arguments become more complicated if the agreements in-
clude, as they usually do, a clause providing that the government is
free to adopt legislation to protect the public safety, health, and
morals, as an exercise of its police power. Because the merger
clause and the police power clause are really boilerplate provisions
and therefore not likely to be individually negotiated, a court is
faced with the problem of interpreting the precise intent of the
parties at the time they negotiated the contract, with respect to
the government's right to impose additional burdens on the con-
tractor. For example, the parties could have anticipated implicitly
that differing standards would not be imposed upon the contractor
in the absence of unforeseen developments. Therefore, a newly-
elected legislative body that adopts different, but not necessarily
better, standards of general application could be held to have mod-
ified the agreement, even though the written agreement expressly
permits the government to adopt police power ordinances.
A court can best resolve these problems by ignoring the fact
that one party is governmental. Too frequently, a court's discus-
sion of the modification issues includes references to the scope of
the police power and other issues that are more relevant to the
ultimate constitutionality than they are to the impairment of the
contract. Courts should determine the modification question solely
by application of principles governing the interpretation of con-
tracts, including the parol evidence rule and similar doctrines.2 40
The parol evidence rule is especially important in interpreting con-
tracts that include police power and government force majeure
clauses.2" Because such clauses are so broadly worded and yet sel-
dom negotiated, a court will often be required to rely on parol evi-
dence as to what meaning, if any, the parties gave to the contract
language.
239. In less formal contracts that do not include a merger clause, state law regarding
the implication of covenants may preclude an argument by the contractor that the state
implicitly agreed not to impose different standards.
240. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-202 (parol evidence rule relevant to contracts involving the purchase
and sale of goods).
241. See supra note 195.
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B. When is a Modification an Impairment?
Whether a modification always constitutes an "impairment" is
a difficult issue simply because the Court's decisions on this issue
are confusing. In United States Trust, the Court first quoted
Blaisdell and El Paso to the effect that not every modification of
an obligation is an impairment. The Court then found a "techni-
cal" impairment and determined whether that impairment violated
the contract clause.2 42 Spannaus represents a different approach.
There, Justice Stewart determined whether a substantial impair-
ment existed and then measured the significance of the impair-
ment against the importance of the public purpose of the impair-
ing legislation.2 4 In Energy Reserves, the Court adopted the
Spannaus approach, but it also cited United States Trust on the
impairment issue.24'
By reading these Burger Court decisions together, one may es-
tablish a three-step approach to determine whether a statute vio-
lates the contract clause. First, is there a modification? If so, does
such modification constitute an impairment? Lastly, is it an un-
constitutional impairment? Such an analysis is not necessary.
Rather, the question should be whether the modification that the
legislation imposes simply breaches the contract like any other
unilateral attempt to modify an agreement, or whether the statute
prevents or materially limits the contractor's ability to enforce his
contractual rights. For example, legislation impairs a public con-
tract only if it prevents or materially limits the remedies that
would be available if the contract were between private parties. 45
In the case of private contracts, legislation that "permits" one
party to breach may make breach more likely to occur, but it does
not constitute an impairment unless it also precludes the other
party from obtaining redress in court.2 46 Because recourse to the
legal system is the essence of a contract right, impairment requires
not merely interference with the contract that results in a breach
but interference with the remedies for breach. Defining "impair-
ment" as an act permitting or requiring breach would subject vir-
tually all economic legislation to attack under the contract clause.
Certainly, the Framers could not have intended the clause to have
242. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
244. Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 704-05.
245. See supra note 219.
246. Cf. New Brunswick v. Milltown, 686 F.2d 120, 134-35 (3rd Cir. 1982) (involving
federal agency and municipal corporation).
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such broad application.
C. Impairment in the Absence of Modification
It is not as obvious that a taking has occurred when legislation
imposes an additional obligation upon a party to a contract, as it is
when legislation has deprived a party of a right or relieved the
other party of an obligation. In Spannaus, the Court held that the
imposition of an additional obligation can constitute an impair-
ment under the contract clause, but it is more difficult to see how
an imposition of an additional obligation can constitute a taking
where the obligation does not result in a destruction or invasion of
tangible property. The mere imposition of an additional obligation
will undoubtedly result in a monetary loss to a contracting party,
but courts have seldom held that such a loss would constitute a
"taking" because virtually any legislation may be attacked on that
ground.2 4
In many public contract situations, legislation imposing addi-
tional obligations on the contractor may simply constitute a
breach. If the contractor refuses to comply with the additional ob-
ligation, the government can either withhold payment or terminate
the contract. In either circumstance, the contractor can sue for the
breach. The legislation is nothing more than an unjustified de-
mand by a party for additional benefits. Usually, however, a court
will interpret the legislation as foreclosing the remedy for breach of
contract. For example, a court may determine that a statute re-
quiring different pollution control equipment on a public project
after the contractor has installed conforming equipment precludes
a lawsuit by the contractor under contract law or other state law.
Such an interpretation would make the statute a true impairment
because it neither breaches the contract nor nullifies a contract
right, and yet it deprives the contractor of a protected reliance in-
terest. In other words, where the contractor has performed or com-
menced performance so that his right to payment is a protected
247. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40 (public project agreement example).
Minimum wage legislation is a good example. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). Such a statute increases the cost of doing business in the future and is therefore
primarily prospective in application. But it also has retroactive effects, both as to existing
employment agreements (that are probably insignificant) and the return the employers orig-
inally expected from its investment in a plant and equipment. This view demonstrates again
the importance of adequately defining the interest protected. See supra notes 199-203 and
accompanying text; cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) ("retroactive"
black lung compensation program upheld).
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reliance interest, the statute has "impaired" an "obligation of con-
tract" and is therefore within the scope of the contract clause. It
does not, however, follow that the statute is unconstitutional.
It has been settled since Blaisdell that the proscription of the
contract clause is not absolute. Courts are now required to balance
the contractor's interest, which the contract clause protects,
against the public interest, which the police power protects. Analo-
gizing the contract clause to a decree for an injunction of specific
performance under contract law, the last element of this analysis is
the balancing of public versus private interest that is a part of
every equity court decision.
VII. GIVING EFFECT TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. The Proper Scope of Judicial Review
The analysis to this point has led to the conclusion that courts
should invoke the contract clause only if legislation adversely af-
fects a claimant's contractual reliance interest in a manner that
deprives the claimant of effective redress under both state law and
the taking clause. At this point it is appropriate to ask the ques-
tion: What is the consequence of a finding that a statute impairs
an obligation within the meaning of the contract clause?
Even though one or all interest groups may have contractual
interests that might be harmed, any interpretation of the meaning
of the contract clause should to some extent permit a state to cope
with unavoidable conflicts in rights. The Court, however, has failed
to delineate the balance of powers between the judiciary and the
legislature in this area.2" 8 It is a premise of this Article that signifi-
cant judicial review of legislative determinations under the con-
tract clause is both appropriate and consistent with constitutional
law in general.
One of Justice Brennan's primary criticisms of the stricter
standard of review that United States Trust imposed was that it
equated the protection given to property rights with that given
"personal" rights.249 Such criticism is not well-founded. The dis-
tinction between "personal" and "property" rights, although seem-
ingly a clear one at the polar extremes, ignores the fundamental
248. Professor Schwartz has interpreted United States Trust as requiring the same
strict scrutiny in cases involving economic rights as is required in cases involving fundamen-
tal interests. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 118.
249. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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relationship between economic rights and liberty.2 50 A system of
review dependent upon labeling alone is incapable of fully evaluat-
ing the real interests at stake in cases like United States Trust. To
say that mere property rights were involved incorrectly assumes
that none of the bondholders, including beneficiaries of trusts that
institutions like U.S. Trust administered, were dependent on the
expected return for the necessities of life.25'
It has been argued that the clause is merely a limitation on the
means available for states to achieve otherwise legitimate ends.
Not only can the states not abolish contracts in general, they can-
not act with malice toward, or in disregard of, contractual rights.
52
A court's approach in response to such an argument would focus
on whether the effect on contracts Was incidental or primary or,
perhaps, on whether the legislature intended to harm contractual
interests. The Blaisdell court rejected the primary versus inciden-
tal labeling of effects;25 although legislative intent should be a fac-
tor in contract clause analysis,5 " two considerations mandate that
it not be the sole element. First, such a narrow analysis would ig-
nore the antimajoritarian basis of the clause and the role contracts
play in the growth of commerce. Even benign impairment violates
the clause's underlying policy. Secondly, a narrow interpretation of
"legislative malice" would permit pure-hearted but empty-headed
legislatures to blithely nullify reliance interests to promote even
the most dubious "public" benefits. Regardless of the nature of the
contractual interest involved, a broad interpretation of the concept
would give contract claims an arbitrary preference over noncon-
tract claims.
Such a minimal scrutiny or motive test would be merely a va-
riant of the due process rational basis test. Any standard of review
will be reduced to a rubber stamp if consideration is given only to
the purported benefits of the regulation-whether the purported
legitimate state interest really is legitimate.2 55 Acceptance of the
250. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34, 45-50 (1962); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 119-21.
251. The fallacy of the distinction between personal and property rights becomes more
dangerous as the growth of pension funds and direct access to capital markets makes many
more "consumers" direct investors.
252. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 56-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, A Pro-
cess-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623 (1980).
253. See supra note 155.
254. See infra notes 317-21 and accompanying text.
255. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), for example, negates any
claim that the rational basis test in fact requires a balancing test.
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premise that meaningful judicial review is appropriate suggests
that the benefits of the legislation should be balanced against the
harm that the affected contractual interests will suffer. Indeed,
since Blaisdell, the Court has recognized either explicitly or im-
plicitly the need for balancing. However, it has yet to develop a
consistent approach. Under Spannaus, a court must carefully ex-
amine the nature and purpose of the legislation to determine if it
justifies an impairment. This is a more strict version of the balanc-
ing approach than that which the Court implicitly adopted in
Blaisdell and El Paso but explicitly rejected in United States
Trust. Energy Reserves and Exxon have apparently relaxed the
Spannaus standard and reverted to the El Paso approach. The
reason that the Court has been unable to develop a proper balanc-
ing test is that it has relied on the police power doctrine to recon-
cile the need to protect the public interest with the directive of the
contract clause.2 56
B. The Inadequacies of the Police Power Doctrine
An understanding of the origins and rise of the police power
doctrine is essential to an understanding of the balancing approach
that the Court uses in contract clause cases. The police power doc-
trine, which provides that contract rights are held subject to a le-
gitimate exercise of the police power, 7 is a direct descendant of
the Marshallian approach to the clause.258 Chief Justice Marshall
based his holding that the clause was an absolute barrier to any
modification of a contract upon his belief that the protection of
property interests was a fundamental obligation of the Court.2 9
Thus, under the Marshall Court, contract clause decisions were
often based upon "natural" distinctions, such as whether the stat-
ute affected the obligation of the contract or merely the remedy
awarded for breach.2 0
The growing complexity of American society was creating new
tensions between the reliance interests of contractors and the free-
256. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 44.
258. See supra notes 19-69 and accompanying text.
259. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 26-29; cf. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 271 (The Framers
intended to establish a principle that contracts must not be interfered with by legislative
activity, i.e., contracts should be inviolable.).
260. See Hale, supra note 5, at 526-27; cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
122, 200 (1819) ("The distinction between the obligation . . . and the remedy. . . exists in
the nature of things.").
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dom of the government to protect the public interest in light of
changing circumstances. As these tensions grew too great for the
Court to ignore, it resorted to the fiction of implying conditions in
contracts to give effect to the public interest. For example, once
the Court had determined that corporate charters were contracts
that the Constitution protected, 2 ' it had to find a way to curb the
growing power of corporations. The Court therefore developed the
doctrine that the power of the state to amend or repeal the charter
was an implied condition of its granting.21 2 In the same vein, the
police power doctrine was originally interpreted as an implied con-
dition in a public contract making the state's contractual obliga-
tion subject to the proper exercise of its police power.268 Doctri-
nally, it would have been simpler.and more direct to resolve these
issues by holding that public contracts were not intended to be
within the constitutional prohibition.264
Professor Powe268 has recently traced the development of the
police power doctrine from the dicta in Boyd v. Alabama266 to the
Court's holding three years later in Stone v. Mississippi.267 Powe
cited four cases, in which three Justices offered four different theo-
retical bases for the doctrine. This judicial reaction was undoubt-
edly a response to the rejection of the doctrine that states reserved
the power to amend corporate charters. Corporations made various
creative arguments as to why their charters were not subject to the
doctrine. The police power concept seemed to offer a way to avoid
the factual arguments inherent in the reserved power to amend the
doctrine. Boyd, which involved the repeal of a statute authorizing
lotteries, denied the "competence" of one legislature to bind later
legislatures. 26 8 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,26' which involved a state
prohibition law affecting a corporation chartered to manufacture
and sell liquor, recognized the ability of the legislature to affect
261. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
262. Id. at 675 (Story, J., concurring); Miller v. New York, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478
(1872); see also WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 167-68 (citing Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113
U.S. 574 (1885), as the source of this rule).
263. Justice Blackmun, at times in United States Trust, seems to have this conception
of the doctrine when he refers to the "reserved power" of the state. United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977).
264. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 99.
265. See supra note 10.
266. 94 U.S. 645, 650 (1876).
267. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). The intermediate cases were Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97
U.S. 25, 33 (1877), and Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 669 (1878).
268. Boyd, 94 U.S. at 650.
269. 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1878).
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
rights that had not yet vested. Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park,2 70
which involved an ordinance barring fertilizer manufacturing, re-
lied on the fact that the state's police power predated the federal
constitution and that all property is held on the condition that it
will not harm others. In Stone, another lottery case, the Court fi-
nally settled on the theory that even the people cannot bargain
away the police power and that every public contract is therefore
made on the implicit understanding that the government can take
the right away at any time.2 7 1
Stone established the doctrine and provided authority for
states to override both their own contracts and those between pri-
vate parties.2 72 Unfortunately, during the ninety-seven year inter-
val between Stone and United States Trust, the Court was either
unwilling or unable to clarify the theoretical basis for the doctrine
or determine precisely when it applies.
The primary problem with the police power doctrine as the
Court has promulgated it in Stone, is that it starts from an incor-
rect premise. Whether the contract clause protects a given contrac-
tual obligation is clearly a question of federal law.278 Whether a
contract is binding in the first instance upon the state that made
it, however, is not and should not be a question of federal law un-
less the state is attempting to evade the federal constitution. The
Constitution does not dictate to a state how the powers of govern-
ment are to be divided between its legislature and the people. The
extent to which a state can bargain away its sovereignty would ap-
pear to be a matter of state constitutional law.174 Contract clause
cases, however, have not considered state law in determining
whether contracting parties can bargain away a given power.
Rather, the decisions have been based upon the Justices' views re-
garding natural law and the theory of government. For example, in
Stone, Chief Justice Waite contended that parties could bargain
away at least part of the taxing power because the government was
270. 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878).
271. Stone, 101 U.S. at 819-20.
272. As Blaisdell demonstrates, the use of the police power doctrine has not been lim-
ited to public contracts.
273. See supra text accompanying note 229.
274. Under article 4 of the United States Constitution, the United States guarantees to
each state a republican form of government. Whether a state has a republican form of gov-
ernment is a political question not justiciable in federal courts. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849). Apparently, however, Congress can enforce the guarantee. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-32 (1962). But Baker lends support to the view that the degree of
"sovereignty" that a government retains is not at issue in article 4.
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not organized for taxation, even though taxation admittedly was
necessary.2 7 5 On the other hand, neither the legislature nor the
people themselves could bargain away the police power because
government was organized to exercise that power.Y
It is difficult to see why the states should have less freedom to
contract than individual citizens. As Professor Hale has cogently
argued, a state, like a private individual, should be able to contract
away some of its freedom without necessarily being permitted to
contract away all of its freedom.2 7 Just as our society will not per-
mit an individual to contract himself into slavery, society need not
permit a state to bargain away an unnecessarily large part of its
sovereignty. Admittedly, the police power doctrine serves the use-
ful purpose of insuring that corrupt transactions that preceding
legislatures made do not burden a state; however, it is not neces-
sary to cloud all transactions to protect the state against those few.
Because the claimant must first demonstrate that its contract is
valid and enforceable under state law, concepts such as fraud and
unconscionability provide a remedy in the few cases of corrupt or
improvident dealing. Justice Blackmun appeared to be searching
for such criteria when he adopted the "reasonable and necessary"
test in United States Trust. That test, however, comes into play
only if a court determines that the original contract was valid when
the parties adopted it-when the subject of the contract was an
aspect of sovereignty that the state could bargain away.2 78
Even if the rationale of the doctrine is accepted at face value,
characterizing the binding effect of a contract according to the gov-
ernment power involved is an extremely inefficient way to protect
the public interest. It seems settled that the state can bargain
away the taxing and spending powers because they are nonessen-
tial but that the eminent domain and police powers are inaliena-
ble.17 The issue is simply a matter of classification. For example,
Justice Blackmun in United States Trust recognized that "the
Contract Clause does not require a State to adhere to a contract
275. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879).
276. Id.
277. Hale, supra note 5, at 653-54.
278. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26.
279. Compare Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (police power is inaliena-
ble) with West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (eminent domain pow-
ers are "nonalienable") and New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (taxation
power is "alienable"). See generally Hale, supra note 5, at 638-63 (examining the implica-
tions of contracting away the power of eminent domain, the power to tax, and the police
power).
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that surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty. 2 80 He
found, however, that the New Jersey statute was not a police
power measure even though it was intended to permit the Author-
ity to take steps to reduce pollution and urban congestion. Re-
jecting the use of "formalistic distinctions" regarding those powers
that a state may bargain away as dispositive of the contract clause
issue, he determined that the contract was binding on New Jersey
because it involved a "financial obligation" of the state.281 He rec-
ognized that there is no clear dividing line between financial and
nonfinancial obligations and attempted to clarify the concept by
distinguishing the 1962 covenant from a covenant that would re-
quire the state to continue to operate a facility for the term of the
bonds even if a health hazard were involved.2 8 This distinction,
however, is not helpful. Any party can complete most contractual
undertakings that become problematic provided he is willing and
able to make further expenditures. For example, if a state-operated
facility produced a health hazard due to pollution, the state might
be able to continue to operate the facility by expending additional
amounts on pollution control. It seems clear that Justice Blackmun
does not intend to imply that the government is relieved from all
obligations to comply with its undertakings simply because a
health hazard is involved. Indeed, Justice Brennan's dissent force-
fully argued that health was exactly what was involved in the
case.
2 88
Essentially the Court has converted every contract related to
the police power into a contract revocable or impairable at will,
thereby inflating the risk component of the contract price. The un-
desirable result from an increase in the risk that a state may uni-
laterally revoke a contract, which a contracting party views as an
increase in the risk that the state will breach, is that states must
now pay higher costs for public contracts. This proposition as-
sumes that when a party enters into a contract with the govern-
ment he knows that the state in the exercise of its police power
may unilaterally impair his rights and increase his obligation.
Thus, the risk the contractor takes that a state will not perform in
accord with the terms expressed in the agreement is increased, and
the rational contractor will increase his projected profit margin to
absorb the increased risk. In a perfect world, the risk premium
280. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23.
281. Id. at 24-26; see supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
282. Id. at 25.
283. Id. at 34-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that a contractor would charge would be spread among all con-
tracts in an amount equal to the risk actually involved; but in a
time of spiraling government regulation on matters of health,
safety, and consumerism, it is likely that the risk premium is over-
estimated. Even if the risk premium were efficiently allocated
among various types of contracts, the revocable nature of public
contracts is inequitable because it results in windfalls or losses to
the contractors involved depending upon whether a police power or
taxing measure impairs a particular contract. In short, the formal-
istic distinction between the police power and other government
powers has no sound basis in contract clause doctrine or in reason
and should be discarded.
Stone v. Mississippi284 and cases like Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad v. Goldsboro285 appear to give unlimited authority to leg-
islatures to renege on earlier contracts. The Court, however, has
also recognized that there are limits to the police power doctrine as
it applies to public contracts. In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois,280 the Illinois Legislature had granted to a railroad not only
the entire Chicago harbor but all adjoining lands that could proba-
bly later be added to the harbor. The Court held that a revocation
of the grant was constitutional because the grant was a perversion
of the public trust and an abdication of governmental power. Jus-
tice Field recognized, however, that small grants of public property
to improve commerce and navigation are valid if they do not sub-
stantially impair the public interest.287 In Appleby v. New York ,288
the Court refused to permit New York to revoke a grant of water-
front property on Manhattan Island. The grant was within the
class that Justice Field described in Illinois Central as binding
upon the state, and the Court hinted that a desire to use the prop-
erty for New York's own profit rather than a need to regulate the
land for the public interest motivated New York to revoke the
grant. 89 Implicit in Appleby is the recognition that a state could
assert the police power theory to support the attempted regulation
of contractual interests merely to further the economic interest of
the state.
This point is made even more strikingly in Missouri, Kansas
284. 101 U.S. 814 (1879); see supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
285. 232 U.S. 548 (1914); see supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
286. 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
287. Id. at 452.
288. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
289. Id. at 393-95, 397-98.
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& Texas Railway Co. v. Oklahoma.2 90 In that case, the railway and
the city had made an agreement concerning the construction of va-
rious crossings across the railway's right of way. The city was to
pay for some costs and both parties were to cover the remaining
expenses. A state commission had adopted an ordinance requiring
the railway to pay for construction of a crossing that the city had
agreed to pay for by itself. The city claimed that the original ordi-
nance had surrendered the city's police power, and therefore, the
contract with the railway was not valid. Justice Butler for the
Court agreed that the contract was void if enforcement of the ordi-
nance hampered the state's power to reasonably regulate the con-
struction and use of railroad crossings.29' However, he viewed the
precise question involved as "whether the agreement of the city to
bear the cost of construction is inconsistent with the proper exer-
tion of the police power. "292 The Court held that the ordinance
that abrogated the original agreement was void under the contract
clause.2'9
The approaches of these cases indicate that the United States
Trust "exception" to the police power doctrine should not be lim-
ited simply to disputes involving municipal bonds or other "finan-
cial obligations" of states but to all government contracts where
the dispute essentially involves the allocation of the cost of enforc-
ing the police power. Although Justice Marshall in Exxon may
have resurrected the doctrine as it applies to private contracts, his
reliance on the police power opinions that Justices Van Devanter
and Butler29 4 wrote, strongly indicates that the old law is still good
law. There should be no question whether a state or local govern-
ment may bargain away its right to impose economic burdens on
others whenever the government acts as an enterprise rather than
as a "mediator."'295 In the typical project agreement dispute, the
question should not be whether the state can require the contrac-
tor to undertake a new statutory obligation that was not within the
contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract,
but rather who is to pay for its undertaking. A court should con-
strue the contract clause as saying to the state that it can require
290. 271 U.S. 303 (1926).
291. Id. at 309-10.
292. Id. at 307.
293. Id. at 310.
294. See supra note 152.
295. The Court has adopted this approach in commerce clause cases where the state
acts as "market participant" versus "market maker." See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 (1980) (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)).
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different or additional equipment to be installed, in at least some
circumstances, only if it is willing to bear the cost.
Similarly, the police power doctrine should be limited in its
application to those regulations that impair private contracts. The
contract clause does not prohibit a state from exercising its police
power to protect special interests or from equalizing bargaining
power unless the regulation affects reliance interests. But when
legislation is retroactive in that sense, the state should not be able
to override protected interests simply to shift cost from one group
to another. In the private contract arena, the police power doc-
trine, at worst, writes the contract clause out of the Constitution
and, at best, serves only to confuse analysis. Of course, a limitation
of the scope of the clause to reliance interests, as suggested earlier,
would drastically reduce the need for the broad police power
doctrine.
In summary, the Court should have seized the opportunity in
United States Trust to reject a broad reading of the police power
doctrine as the doctrinal basis for giving effect to the public inter-
est in an impairment situation. Instead, by focusing on "financial
obligations" as a species of binding public contract,298 the Court
made it more difficult to make the contract clause doctrine consis-
tent either with the nature of modern public contracts or with the
application of the clause to private contracts. The doctrine is most
pernicious when courts arbitrarily apply it to public contracts. The
police power doctrine was developed when the primary forms of
public contracts were the granting of corporate charters and land
grants to utilities and railroads. Public contracts today are incom-
parably complex, and the development of the doctrines of uncon-
scionability and fraud has reduced the dangers of collusion and
corruption. Only if the state is free to enter into reasonable con-
tracts, regardless of the subject matter, will the public interest be
achieved at the lowest cost.
C. Balancing the Police Power Interest
The significance of Blaisdell was that it applied the police
power doctrine in a hard-core contract clause case by holding that
the mortgagee's reliance interest under a private contract was sub-
ordinated to the police power.297 Chief Justice Hughes could have
relied solely on the distinction between right and remedy, but in a
296. See supra text accompanying notes 78-87.
297. See supra text accompanying 52-58.
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carefully worded opinion, he went further and relied on the police
power.2 9 8 Although not explicitly describing his approach as a bal-
ancing approach, he in effect balanced the marginal harm to the
mortgagee (essentially a postponement of collection of principal)
against the state's interest in maintaining a viable family farm sys-
tem and preventing a collapse of the land-based economy that
mass foreclosures could cause. 99 When El Paso adopted the same
approach to less compelling facts, it seemed clear that the applica-
tion of the contract clause turned less on balancing than on
labeling.
The Burger Court has taken an inconsistent approach to bal-
ancing.300 Under United States Trust, impairment of a contract
binding on the state is not permitted simply because the benefits
to the public are greater than the costs to the private contractor.
This approach puts the state in a worse position than it would
have been in under Blaisdell if the contract affected simply an-
other private party. But Justice Blackmun rejected the idea that
balancing was appropriate. 80 1 Rather, Blackmun's view was that
the state could impair a valid contract if the impairment was "rea-
sonable and necessary to serve an important public interest."'3 02
In Spannaus, Energy Reserves, and Exxon, the Court superfi-
cially adopted the "reasonable and necessary" test but applied it in
strange and varied ways. Under United States Trust, the test is to
be applied to both public and private contracts once an impair-
ment is found, but a court cannot completely defer to a state's as-
sessment of what is a reasonable and necessary impairment of a
public contract.303 In Spannaus, however, the Court showed little
deference even though it purported merely to apply the principles
of United States Trust and Blaisdel.3 4 The Energy Reserves
court used the United States Trust terminology, but it in essence
applied a rational basis test.305 Justice Blackmun turned his own
United States Trust test on its head in Exxon by balancing the
state's interest against the absolute language of the contract
clause.306 Blackmun did not give any consideration to ERG's inter-
298. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434.
299. Id. at 439-40; see id. at 421-23 nn.3 & 4 (the importance of Minnesota's interests).
300. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
301. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 29.
302. Id. at 25, 29.
303. Id. at 25-26.
304. Blaisdell, 438 U.S. at 243-44.
305. Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 705.
306. Exxon, 103 S. Ct. at 2307.
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ests, probably because he had already established that the legisla-
tion had not impaired ERG's interest and was merely trying to ex-
tricate the Court from the implications of United States Trust and
Spannaus. Finally, the Exxon Court, after citing the United
States Trust test, simply applied the pre-Blaisdell "reserved" po-
lice power test.307 No balancing was involved because Exxon's
rights had always been subject to the exercise of the police power.
It is not clear why the Court abandoned the "reasonable and
necessary" test so quickly. Justice Brennan's dissent in United
States Trust properly criticized this choice of terminology, 0 8 but
these concepts certainly permit more consistent analysis than the
Court's previous and subsequent approaches. The primary inade-
quacy of the police power doctrine is that it neither distinguishes
between reliance interests and other contract rights nor distin-
guishes cases where the primary effect of the legislation is to im-
pose on a contracting party costs unrelated to the contract or costs
that society in general should bear. Recognition of reliance inter-
ests invites a balancing that traditional pre-Blaisdell doctrine does
not permit. The allocation problem requires consideration of fair-
ness (or "reasonableness," in United States Trust terms) to deter-
mine if the legislature is taking advantage of either its legislative
power to obtain benefits in public contracts or of the lack of politi-
cal power of the adversely affected parties to impose societal costs
on private contracts. Although United States Trust did not satis-
factorily resolve these issues, its effort is more praiseworthy than
the haphazard efforts of the later cases.
If the analysis proposed in this Article were adopted, courts
would seldom reach the balancing issue. The clause would protect
only reliance interests. The claimant could not seek relief under
the clause unless an inverse condemnation remedy was not availa-
ble, and no impairment would be found unless both the promissory
rights and remedial rights were affected. Because these proposals
would narrow the scope of the clause and eliminate many of the
issues that led to the development of the police power doctrine,
there is no need for such a draconian approach at this stage. The
purpose of the proposed analysis is to bring only potential "core"
cases within the scope of the clause in the first place. Such an anal-
ysis would moderate the absolute nature of the clause and drasti-
cally reduce its potential interference with the exercise of the po-
307. Id.
308. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 54 n.17.
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lice power. The only cases left open would be those in which the
state claims that the purpose of the statute is so important that
universal application cannot be postponed just to satisfy the reli-
ance interest of the claimant. Incorporating the traditional police
power doctrine at this stage of the analysis would virtually write
the clause out of the Constitution.
The proposed analysis does not mean, however, that the clause
requires absolute protection even for this narrow class of interests.
There may be cases where the state's interest is so compelling that
even core interests must give way. The United States Trust ap-
proach provides a useful starting point in the search for a solution
to this problem.
An evaluation of the United States Trust test should begin
with a consideration of the relative protection to be afforded prop-
erty rights as opposed to personal rights and of the discretion to be
afforded the judiciary in evaluating the legislature's views as to the
public interest. The scope of judicial review given to state legisla-
tion reflects both factors, but they are not identical. The test that
a court adopts should impose a more difficult hurdle for state legis-
lation than does the police power doctrine while permitting rela-
tively little scope for judicial activism or, perhaps put more accu-
rately, judicial conservatism.
The reasonableness requirement of the United States Trust
test focuses on the legitimate expectations of the parties when they
made the contract. As Chief Justice Burger stated in his concur-
ring opinion in United States Trust, the reasonableness test is sat-
isfied for a public contract if the state shows that when the con-
tract was made, it did not and could not know of the impact of the
contract on the state interest underlying the challenged statute.30 9
The New Jersey statute in United States Trust did not pass this
test. 10 This reasonableness test dramatically differs from the
Blaisdell/EI Paso approach in that it does not involve a balancing
of the merits of the goals of the legislation against the damage to
309. Admittedly, as Justice Brennan argues, the term "reasonable" is confusing because
it is also used in describing the minimal scope of judicial review applied to economic regula-
tory statutes. See supra text accompanying note 92. It is the traditional test, however, that
is misnamed. The test is one of possible rationality: There is or should be a distinction
between a statute with merely a conceivable basis and a statute that rationally furthers an
articulated governmental objective. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 184, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the test is similar to the tradi-
tional test because the judge is not permitted to second guess the legislature's determination
of the need for the statute. The test is one of foreseeability.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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the private interest.
The reasonableness test is closely related to the reliance con-
cept used in determining whether an "obligation" exists. If a party
had no reasonable expectation that he would receive a benefit from
the promise of the other party, no reasonable reliance or "obliga-
tion" may arise. But that does not mean that the reasonableness
test is redundant.""1 Experience has shown that beneficiaries of
legislation will argue changed circumstances as a justification for
impairment even when a reliance interest is clearly present. 2  The
reasonableness test insures that such an argument is rejected in
appropriate cases. For example, when parties enter into a private
contract, the reasonable foreseeability of regulation might prevent
a party from relying on a contract right. When the impact of the
contract on the beneficiary has changed in an unforeseeable man-
ner since contracting, however, the statute still may be enforceable.
This may be the case even if a reliance interest arose because the
development was not foreseeable.3 13
The effect of the reasonableness test is therefore limited in
private contract cases. It is unlikely that a claimant will be able to
meet its burden of demonstrating that the legislature was unrea-
sonable in concluding that the beneficiaries of a statute on the av-
erage should not have anticipated the problem that the statute
seeks to remedy. For example, even if Allied had demonstrated a
reliance interest in Spannaus, a court could properly hold that the
Minnesota Legislature acted "reasonably" in determining that em-
ployees could not appreciate the effect of a plant foreclosure on
their pension rights because of their lack of sophistication. In
short, a state legislature still has substantial power and authority
311. The tort of negligence provides an analogy. Even though foreseeability is the pri-
mary determinant of both duty and proximate cause, analyzing the concepts separately aids
understanding and precision.
312. United States Trust and Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Washington, 696 F.2d 692
(9th Cir. 1983), are just two recent examples. An egregious example is Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 669 (1878), where the Illinois Legislature granted a charter to a
rendering plant to operate outside the city limits and later forced it to move when the city
that subsequently developed around it passed an ordinance that effectively made the plant a
nuisance.
313. Examples of "reasonable" statutes that could impair reliance interests other than
a true windfall profit limitation are difficult to imagine. See supra text accompanying notes
125-26. Justice Blackmun provided another example in United States Trust. In his hypo-
thetical, a state gives a promise to continue operating a facility to secure a revenue bond. A
court could never construe such a promise to be binding on the state where legislation
promulgated to protect health and safety requires that state authorities close the facility.
See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
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under the contract clause to adopt paternal legislation.
The reasonableness test will be of primary importance in pub-
lic contract cases. There is a strong intuitive appeal to the concept
that the government should not get two bites at the contract apple
just because it is the government. If the people collectively make a
bad deal they should be stuck with it just as they would be if they
had acted as individuals.-14 This argument is the inverse of the no-
tion that the legislature has no more power than the people. No-
tions of efficiency and equity support this argument because it
forces the government to devote close attention to its fiscal affairs
when contracting in an effort to avoid wasting resources inherent
in promulgating legislation at a later time to avoid a contractual
obligation or deprive the other contracting party of a contractual
right.
Judges can, of course, manipulate the reasonableness test to
invalidate legislation with which they do not agree, but the test
does not require a judge to impose his own value judgments in de-
termining whether a state has violated the contract clause. In con-
trast, the potential for judicial overreaching is also a major prob-
lWm with the "necessary" part of the United States Trust test.315
The reasonableness test focuses on forseeability, a concept that
should be familiar to every judge. There is little reason to believe
that the difficulty of proving foreseeability will be any different
here than in other areas of the law. The necessary test, on the
other hand, requires a judge to reassess the legislature's decision
on factual matters even if the court does not have the necessary
expertise to do so. Moreover, whether total repudiation of a con-
tractual agreement is essential, or whether a legislature has means
other than promulgating a statute to achieve a legislative objective,
is irrelevant to a judicial determination that a statute violates the
contract clause. The purpose of the contract clause should be to
protect the legitimate reliance interest of the contractor. That con-
tractual interest is not entitled to any more protection than any
other property interest against unwise or unnecessary legislative
action. Although the contract clause may give contract interests
more protection than that which other property rights receive
under the Constitution, thit extra protection should only be availa-
ble when a law arbitrarily or discriminatorily affects contract rights
314. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 529-32, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting) (party that contracted with Texas constitutionally and equitably enti-
tled to its rights under the agreement).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
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on which a party to a contract has relied.
The reasonableness test appears to be consistent with the
goals of the contract clause, but the necessary test is unappealing
because it lends itself to a substitution of judicial judgment for leg-
islative judgment. It does not follow, however, that the concept of
reasonableness should be the sole test to determine whether an im-
pairment is in fact unconstitutional. Indeed, one can envision com-
mon contractual situations in which an alleged impairment would
satisfy the reasonableness test and yet still entail an arbitrary ele-
ment of government action. For example, assume the state has sold
to a corporation a right-of-way over public lands to build and oper-
ate a petroleum pipeline. The right-of-way contract includes stan-
dards to protect against environmental damage that leaks may
cause in the line. If it later unexpectedly develops that the mate-
rial used to wrap the pipeline to protect against leaks is an attrac-
tive, yet deadly foodstuff for wildlife, a court could justifiably con-
clude that legislation that requires the company to remove or cover
the wrapping is "reasonable." Legislation, however, that requires
the corporation to raise the pipeline an additional six feet above
the ground is arbitrary if a less arastic, but equally effective mea-
sure, such as using different wrapping, is readily available.
This is the type of issue that the necessary test resolves. The
Court's United States Trust test incorporates the necessary test
but goes one step further because it also requires that the court
determine whether the legislation was essential to the achievement
of a legislative purpose s16 A better solution would be to adopt the
"studied indifference" approach of W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kava-
naugh."' Under this test, the contract clause at a minimum pro-
hibits the state from adopting as a policy the destruction or nonen-
316. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
317. 295 U.S. 56 (1935). Kavanaugh involved an Arkansas statute that modified the
foreclosure provisions relating to the security for district improvement bonds issued three
years before the Arkansas legislature passed the amending statute. Justice Cardozo, in re-
versing the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas upholding the statute, found that the
statute did not provide the same protections to the mortgagees as the Minnesota statute did
in Blaisdell. He wrote: "With studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his
appropriate protection" the framers of the statute "have taken from the mortgage the qual-
ity of an acceptable investment for a rational investor." Id. at 60. Justice Cardozo prefaced
this statement with the caution that he was stating the "outermost limits" of the police
power and that the bounds could be even narrower. Id. The effect of the Arkansas statute
was to extend the interval between default by a landowner on assessments and foreclosures
from approximately sixty-five days to over two and one-half years. Id. at 61. In addition, the
extension of a redemption period left the trustee for the bonds without a remedy for six and
one-half years. Id.
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forcement of contracts.1 8 "Studied indifference" is no less vague
than "necessary," but it is intended to require the same type of
legislative attention to the interest of affected parties as that dis-
played in Bliasdell 1 9 As long as the beneficiary can demonstrate
that the legislature has made an eflort to recognize the reliance
interests of contractors, the legislature's decision cannot be at-
tacked as arbitrary.3 20
The "studied indifference" test, which requires less judicial in-
terference with legislative activities than the United States Trust
approach, deserves a more thorough trial than it has received. 3 2 As
Justice Black argued in El Paso, the test is not a guaranty against
arbitrary government action.2 The primary weakness of the El
Paso decision, however, is not the fact that the legislature was able
to meet the studied indifference test by demonstrating that it had
tried less drastic measures to remedy the problem. Rather, it was,
as Black recognized, that the Court made an unfounded assertion
regarding the "legitimate expectations" of the parties at the time
they contracted.2 3
The studied indifference test would prevent legislatures from
adopting purely political solutions to many economic problems
without permitting the judiciary to select among arguably reasona-
ble alternatives available to the legislature. The classic debtor-re-
lief measure may no longer be a real danger, but its spirit lurks in
the form of statutes like the pass-through prohibition in Exxon s24
and the repeal in United States Trust ;32 it may even be present in
Energy Reserves. The contract clause at a minimum means that
the state cannot solve even serious economic problems by selecting
parties with reliance interests to bear the full burden. To use a
318. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
319. Id.
320. Cf. Note, supra note 252, at 1638 n.75 (judicial deference to legislature rests on the
assumption that a functionally proper political process makes policy determinations and
factual judgments).
321. Justice Brennan believes that Kavanaugh is the "prime exposition of the modern
view" of the role of the contract clause, United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 55-56 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and that Justice Cardozo's test provides an adequate safeguard against arbitrary
government action. Id. at 56-57. Interestingly, however, the Kavanaugh court distinguished
Blaisdel based on the Blaisdell facts of limited interference with the mortgagee's rights and
reliance on court involvement in protecting the mortgagee. Cardozo stated that W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934), governed Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at
63. Kavanaugh then is not necessarily more protective of the police power than Blaisdell.
322. El Paso, 379 U.S. at 528-33.
323. Id. at 529-30.
324. Exxon, 103 S. Ct. at 2299-300.
325. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 9-14.
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fertile metaphor, the legislature cannot napalm contract rights
when pruning shears will do the job, nor can it trample even the
weeds of reliance interests just because it is easier to clear the way
for economic justice by doing so. That does not mean that the leg-
islature cannot ultimately trample the weeds but only that it must
first decide whether it can achieve its goal in less drastic (for the
weeds) fashion. Thus, the Court may have rightfully decided En-
ergy Reserves and Exxon,82 but the Court should have required
the proponent of the legislation to demonstrate a need for the
interference.'2
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in United States Trust and
Spannaus created more issues than they resolved, and it appears
that Energy Reserves and Exxon will have the same effect. Sub-
stantial gaps and ambiguities continue to plague the contract
clause doctrine. This Article suggests a remedy designed to reduce
contract disputes involving constitutional questions to a minimum
by limiting the scope of the contract clause to cases in which legis-
lation would have a severe retroactive effect on reliance interests.
In a sense, this approach accepts the validity of Justice Holmes's
aphorism that parties may not prevent legislation from affecting
their property by making a contract about it, 25 and adds to it the
concept that a state cannot obtain unbargained-for benefits, for it-
self or for a favored class, simply by passing pertinent legislation.
Courts should reject the notion that a party entering into a
contract assumes the risk that any exercise of police power can ar-
bitrarily affect his contractual duties and rights because that idea
leads to hidden costs to the public and inequitable results among
contracting parties. The legislature and administrative agencies
should be free to determine what is in the best interest of the peo-
ple at any given time by entering into binding contracts. The
courts should permit interference with contract rights only when
326. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. 400 (1983); Exxon, 103 S. Ct. at 2296.
327. This does not necessarily mean that a court must limit its consideration of legisla-
tive purposes to those stated in the statute. But cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (no
rational basis upon which legislation in question could be imposed to further a legitimate
state purpose); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (defin-
ing the rational basis test).
328. "One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restrictions, cannot re-
move them from the power of the state by making a contract about them." Hudson Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
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(a) there is no reliance interest, (b) a contract or inverse condem-
nation remedy is available, (c) enforcement of the contract against
the public would be unconscionable, or (d)(1) the contract has un-
foreseen effects that adversely affect the public interest and (2) the
legislation demonstrates a due regard for the protection of reliance
interests. Conversely, a statute should be unconstitutional under
the contract clause only when it (a) prevents or restricts enforce-
ment of a reliance interest, (b) cannot be compensated under con-
tract law or the taking clause, and (c)(1) has unforeseeable adverse
impacts or (2) reflects abdication by the legislature of its responsi-
bility to show due regard for such interests. Courts should also re-
ject the idea that the public should not bear the risk of a bad bar-
gain that the government made. State and local governments
should have the same capacity to enter into binding contracts as
individuals. The general public should share losses on public con-
tracts rather than the contractor who has more accurately evalu-
ated the risks involved.
The application of this approach leads to the conclusion that
the Court wrongly decided United States Trust.82 9 The Court
should have limited the bondholders to an action for inverse con-
demnation unless it was found that valuation of the 1962 covenant
was too speculative. If inverse condemnation was not available, the
Court should have held the repeal of the covenant to violate the
contract clause, because it failed both the reasonable and the stud-
ied indifference tests. The statute failed to satisfy the studied in-
difference test because no effort was made to provide substitute
protection to the bondholders. To argue that other covenants ade-
quately protected the bondholders at the time of repeal is to ignore
the vagaries of the financial world and the generally recognized
need for both a belt and suspenders to protect against contingen-
cies. State and local governments should not have the right to sim-
ply change their minds regarding the wisdom and value of their
contracts. Parties contracting with the government should be pro-
tected from the government's greed or whimsy.
The Supreme Court wrongly decided Spannaus 3 0 because the
statute did not affect a reliance interest of the employer's or, if it
did, the statute dealt with contingencies that the employees argua-
bly did not appreciate when the contract was made and resolved
the issue with due concern for employers' interests. The Court cor-
329. See supra text accompanying notes 70-92.
330. See aupra text accompanying notes 93-104.
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rectly decided Energy Reserves33 1 because ERG appeared not to
have any right under state law that had been affected. Even if it
had a right, it could have protected itself by using a force majeure
provision. Whatever rights ERG had were therefore not reliance
interests that the contract clause protected. The Court also rightly
decided Exxon332 because no reliance interest was apparent. From
a doctrinal point of view, however, the Court wrongly decided both
Energy Reserves and Exxon because both opinions relapsed into
an uncritical use of the Holmes aphorism3 " and failed to ade-
quately explain apparent shifts in doctrine.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 110-23.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 136-52.
333. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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